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Finding a political framework for self-government in Northern Ireland that will be
supported by both nationalists and unionists is referred to as a modern day attempt to do the
impossible—to "square the circle." During the latest phase of the Troubles, from 1968 to 1996,
there have been many attempts to bring peace to Northern Ireland by creating a negotiated
settlement, but none has worked. This thesis compares two of the most significant attempts, the
first in 1973 and the second in 1993, to evaluate prospects for peace in the future. Although the
goals of both attempts were the same (a devolved government, economic recovery, and the
cessation of terrorist violence), a comparison shows important differences in the political
atmosphere and style of the peace process, effected especially by the changing role of the Irish
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Around 200 B.C. mathematicians started trying to solve a classical Greek geometry
problem known as "squaring the circle": given an arbitrary circle, construct a square of the same
area using only a straight edge and compass. In 1882, squaring the circle was proved impossible.
Finding a political framework for self-government in Northern Ireland that will be supported by
both nationalists and unionists is referred to as a modern day attempt to "square the circle." This
thesis does not try to fix centuries-old problems; rather, it analyzes two attempts to find a
solution in the latest phase of the troubles, from 1968 to 1996. This thesis compares the 1973
and 1993 attempts at peace, and through these case studies reviews the wide historical context of
the conflict, identifies significant events and behaviors that influence the peace process, and
points out prospects for peace based on the achievements and failings of the two attempts.
The conflict in Northern Ireland is difficult to grasp until one acknowledges that the
problem is more complex than the stereotyped war about religion. Precisely because of its
complexity and long history, analysis in this thesis is limited to the last 30 years of the conflict
and two specific attempts to restore order:
1
.
The 1973 attempt was the first to try to reconstruct some form of self-government in
Northern Ireland after its parliament at Stormont was abolished and direct rule imposed from the
British parliament at Westminster. Direct rule created a political vacuum at the local level which
the 1973 attempt tried to fill with a Northern Ireland assembly, executive, and all-Ireland
Council of Ireland. The goals of this attempt were embodied in the Sunningdale Agreement of
1973. Although the 1973 attempt failed, it is significant because it contains two elements that
every serious attempt since have included: a power-sharing government with responsibilities
devolved from Westminster, and the inclusion of the Republic of Ireland in the future of the
north.
2. The 1993 attempt is the most recent one to construct a political settlement. Unlike
1973, its goal was not to establish and run a new type of government, but to organize "all-party"
talks with representatives from the democratically mandated political parties. Party
representatives were supposed to discuss and then create a new form of self-government. The
goals of this attempt were embodied in the Downing Street Declaration of 1993 and the
Framework Documents of 1995. For almost two years it looked like this attempt might work,
but progress stalled and it too failed. It is critical to examine the latest attempt at peace because
it will be the starting point for the next one.
The social conflict dates back to the 17th century and is typified by intense hostility
between Catholics and Protestants. Although Protestants dominated the political order of Ireland
since the 1600s, due to their minority status within the whole Catholic island they developed a
"siege mentality" and built temporary walls of security through oppressive civil discrimination
of Catholics. When Ireland became a part of the United Kingdom in 1 800, division between the
two camps took on new political terms: most Catholics became nationalists who wanted a free
and independent Ireland, while most Protestants became unionists who would fight for the
political tie with Britain.
When the island was partitioned in 1920 Protestants became the majority in the northern
province of Ulster. The Catholic minority in Ulster naturally cultivated their own "siege
mentality." With partition the term unionist was associated with defense of the bond between
Ulster and the United Kingdom; the term nationalist came to mean unification of the island in
addition to independence. Each side has its share of militants who promote violence to reach
their goals: loyalists are militant unionists, republicans are extreme nationalists. When Northern
Ireland's Protestant parliament at Stormont was abolished in 1973 the status of Ulster as a
province of the United Kingdom was unchanged, but the internal constitutional structure was in
confusion. A crisis developed over the proper construction of a new framework for self-
governance in Northern Ireland.
There are three prominent reasons why a study of Northern Ireland is relevant to national
security and policy. First, it shows us how a western democracy responds to political violence.
As terrorism becomes one of the most important topics of national and international security, it is
instructive to see how Britain and Ireland deal legally and militarily with inter-communal
violence and extreme nationalism. Second, while Northern Ireland is a valuable case study, it
may be even more instructive to compare it to other conflicts, such as the Basque separatist
movement in Spain. Observing the two can teach them and us what has or hasn't worked in the
past in the search to find negotiated settlement. Finally, over the last twenty years the peace
process in Northern Ireland has expanded and now involves third parties, in particular, the
United States. While Ulster may never be America's highest foreign policy priority, our
increased involvement since the 1993 peace attempt needs to be monitored— it could be one of
our greatest successes or it could become a quagmire of violence.
Research methodology for this thesis consisted of a chronology of events and the
analysis of historians and political scientists. The comparison of the two attempts is based upon
evidence gathered from a literature review of the history of Northern Ireland and political
violence, formal texts of key agreements and communiques, documents of the British
Government, and newspapers and magazines of the day. Chapter II is a synopsis of significant
events in the development of the Republic of Ireland and Ulster up to the middle 1960s. Chapter
III recounts the events of the late 1960s to 1976, focusing on the 1973 attempt. Chapter IV
covers the intervening years from 1977 to 1992 and chronicles the Downing Street Declaration,
the paramilitary cease-fires, and the Framework for Peace documents. Chapter V is a
comparison and analysis of the case studies. Chapter VI concludes the thesis with lessons to
learn, theoretical and practical, for future attempts at peace.
I hope that by comparing the two attempts the reader will appreciate the complicated
political and social tapestry of Ireland, recognize the major issues that every peace attempt deals
with, and comprehend the challenge of finding a constitutional resolution in the face of political
violence.

II. HISTORY OF NORTHERN IRELAND TO 1967
Although the Reformation played a tremendous role in the development of political
divisions based upon religious affiliation, that animosity could not have been sustained without
the discriminatory laws and social prejudices that continued to be nurtured well past any rational
explanation. The battle in Northern Ireland is not, after all, about the transubstantiation of the
Eucharist, but about power and security, and the fact that neither Protestants nor Catholics have
ever felt that they had either. A brief review of Ireland's long and turbulent history will
highlight the issues that consistently serve as stumbling blocks for a lasting resolution to the
northern troubles—the goals of unionists v. nationalists, the tradition of physical force
republicanism, partition, and Protestant hegemony in Ulster. Depending on the reader's
interpretation, Ireland is a country without history because its past is being constantly repeated, 1
or, in other words, it is an example of "how those who remember the past are especially
condemned to repeat its mistakes."
A. MEDIEVAL IRELAND TO THE ACT OF UNION
Ireland is an ancient land that pre-dates Christ by 8000 years; by the eighth century its
people were predominantly Roman Catholic. Britain first invaded Ireland in 1 169 but the
invaders intermingled with the natives and succeeded in controlling only a few hundred square
miles around Dublin. Four hundred years later the Tudors finally conquered Ireland in 1603.
The impact of Tudor rule, however, came from the course of maritime imperial glory it set for
England. By the 17th century Ireland was strategically important for the protection of Britain's
western flank from foreign armadas, but Irish loyalty to their Protestant rulers was doubtful since
the 16th century Reformation had failed to convert most of the Catholic natives.
A cluster of nine counties in the north-east known as Ulster was especially resistant to
English influence. To strengthen Irish allegiance to the Crown, Britain encouraged the
immigration of Scottish and English Protestants to Ulster. The "plantation of Ulster" succeeded
in colonizing a part of Ireland with subjects who would maintain their "Englishness" rather than
1
"Ireland is almost a land without a history, because the troubles of the past are relived as contemporary
events." Richard Rose, Governing Without Consensus: An Irish Perspective (Boston: Beacon Press,
1971), 75.
2
Padraig O'Malley, Biting at the Grave: The Irish Hunger Strikes and the Politics ofDespair (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1990)9.
succumb to Irish culture. The colonization of Ulster, though, became a touchstone in nationalist
history—a symbol of the displacement of Catholic natives by Protestant foreigners who, in
addition to stripping the Irish of their homes, imposed oppressive restrictions that barred them
from rights to own and buy land, vote, and hold political office. The seeds of Northern Ireland's
sectarian divide were sown so deeply at this time that 300 years later, in the final quarter of the
20th century, "men and women say they are Catholic, describing not their churchgoing habits but
their political beliefs: they are Irish, not British."
Total British domination of Ireland dates back to the late 1600s when Irish Catholics
supported James II in his struggle to win the British kingdom from the Protestant, William of
Orange. Two battles doomed James' efforts: the first when his Catholic army failed to defeat
Protestants at the siege of the plantation town of Deny in 1689, the second in 1690 when his
troops were decisively routed at the Battle of the Boyne. In 1691 all Catholic forces surrendered
to William, securing an organized British military presence in Ireland.
Oppressive laws by the Protestant rulers inspired the formation of secret societies to
preserve the Irish culture and promote a legitimate and independent nation. In the beginning,
most societies were agrarian based groups of Catholics organized to work for land reform, but by
the late 1700s many secret societies had distinctly political ambitions. It is in secret societies
that the tradition of physical-force republicanism was born. One of the most important groups
was the Society of United Irishmen because it was among the first to advocate the use of
violence to achieve independence. In 1858 sister organizations were founded for militant
republicans—the Fenian Brotherhood in the United States, and the Irish Republican Brotherhood
in Ireland. The Fenian Brotherhood remains a source of republican expatriate support and the
latter became the forerunner of the Irish Republican Army.
Over the years the minority Protestant community cultivated a paranoid siege mentality,
suspecting that Catholics were constantly planning to rise against them. After their fears
materialized during the Rebellion of 1798, most Protestants considered closer ties with Britain a
form of personal protection and therefore supported the 1800 Act of Union that joined the
kingdoms of Ireland and England "for ever." The Act abolished the Irish Parliament that had
been in existence since the Middle Ages and destroyed Irish prerogative in domestic and
international affairs by placing executive decision-making power in the hands of the
John Conroy, Belfast Diary: War as a Way ofLife (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987) 3.
4
Robert Kee, Ireland: A History (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982) 66.
Westminster parliament. Officially, the Act of Union was supposed to make Ireland a partner in
the United Kingdom with opportunities to share in the economic advantages and political
reforms of nineteenth century England. In reality, Protestant support for the passage of the Act
of Union polarized the two religious communities. While the Act meant that Irish MPs would sit
in the House of Commons and Irish peers would take seats in the House of Lords, politically
savvy Protestants regarded the creation of a single Parliament as a guarantee of a permanent
Protestant majority in political matters. Legally, the Act eliminated Irish agitators' claims to
secede and offered Irish subjects two alternatives: deny their nationalist aspirations or reject the
established regime.
B. THE 1800S TO WORLD WAR ONE
There were a number of reforms during the early 1800s, including Catholic
emancipation, that alleviated some of the inter-communal tension. If the reforms caused
nationalist ideals to dissipate in some communities, the issue was reinvigorated and spread
internationally by the Irish Potato Famine. The blight that destroyed potato crops around the
world was especially devastating in Ireland where the potato was the primary source of food for
the Irish peasant population. Between 1840 and 1845 more than one million Irish men, women,
and children, mostly poor Catholic tenant farmers and their families, died of starvation. The
famine forced hundreds of thousands to emigrate, bringing with them to their new lands a
terrible hatred of the British who, in their eyes, had done nothing to prevent the mass starvation.
The United States became the new home of thousands of Irish immigrants who founded societies
that to this day continue to support the republican cause.
By the end of the 19th century some members of the Westminster parliament thought the
time had come consider Irish claims to self-determination. In 1886 the first Home Rule bill was
introduced in the House of Commons. Even though Home Rule did not call for complete Irish
independence, but rather a devolution of political responsibility while remaining within the
British empire, the bill was opposed. Unionists, people who supported the bond between Britain
and Ireland created by the Act of Union, based their opposition on three issues: religion, money,





James Downey, Them and Us: Britain, Ireland and the Northern Question, 1 969- 1982 (Dublin: Ward
River Press, 1983), 38
The 1886 bill failed to pass in the House ofCommons and in 1892 a second Home Rule
bill failed to pass in the House of Lords. But in 1912 a third Home Rule bill was introduced and
in 1914 it was signed into the Statute Book. The bill called for an all-Ireland parliament with
responsibilities for most domestic matters. Issues effecting the Crown such as peace and war,
the army and navy, international treaties, and most taxes belonged to Westminster. Without
question absolute parliamentary supremacy remained in London, yet once the bill's passage
appeared likely Protestants in Northern Ireland protested with anger and violence. In 1913
opponents of the bill formed an organization of 100,000 men known as the Ulster Volunteers
who swore to deny Home Rule to Ulster. In response, nationalists formed their own, though less
well-armed citizen army known as the Irish Volunteers. Before the bill could go into effect,
though, World War One erupted and the bill was suspended for the duration of the war. The
Irish Parliamentary Party representative, the leader of the constitutional Home Rule movement,
pledged the Irish Volunteers to the British war effort, confident that this gesture would guarantee
the implementation of the bill when the war ended.
In 1915 the Supreme Council of the Irish Republican Brotherhood appointed a Military
Committee to take advantage of Britain's involvement in the war and plan an insurrection. On
Easter Monday, 1916, a few hundred Irish Volunteers (those who had not joined the British
Army) captured the General Post Office in the center of Dublin and marched into republican
history. Soon after the green, white and orange tricolor was run up the Post Office flagpole,
Padraig Pearse from the Military Council proclaimed the establishment of "The Provisional
Government of the Irish Republic." The Uprising lasted one week and killed 300 civilians, 60
Volunteers, and 130 British soldiers. Against good advice the British summarily executed 15 of
the rebellion's leaders. In doing so the British badly misjudged Irish social mores and shocked
Irish opinion. The Uprising had been unpopular with the Irish public, but the immediate
executions ensured that when the remaining prisoners were released six months later they were
welcomed home as heroes and the dead ones revered as martyrs. Never anticipated by its
planners to be a military success, thanks to the British the rebellion did achieve its ultimate goal
of rekindling dormant Irish nationalism.
C. PARTITION AND THE STORMONT PARLIAMENT
After World War One the British Government realized that a Home Rule bill could not
be implemented without a fight from Protestants and unionists. From 1918 to 1921 separatists
waged the Tan War, an "archetypal national liberation struggle," distinguished by escalating
guerrilla warfare between unionists and nationalists. Britain, exhausted from World War One
and the Tan War, decided that separating the nationalists from the unionists by partitioning the
island was a reasonable solution to quell the violence. The Government of Ireland Act 1920
created separate Parliaments—one in Belfast to represent six northern counties in Ulster
(themselves broken away from the traditional nine county cluster of Ulster), and one in Dublin to
represent the remaining 26 counties. In addition to separate parliaments a Council of Ireland was
proposed with limited responsibilities for all 32 counties and which might eventually become a
single all-Ireland Parliament federated to Westminster. Both parts of Ireland would continue to
send representatives to Westminster which reserved the powers of defense, foreign affairs, and
coining money.
By 1921 the strength of the southern nationalist rebels made partition, while not ideal, at
least acceptable to Ulster Unionists. Although the 1920 Act had not been supported by unionists
in its entirety, primarily because of the concept of the Council of Ireland, they accepted the 1921
Anglo-Irish Treaty that formally partitioned Ireland. According to the Treaty the southern 26
counties became known as the Irish Free State and a dominion of the United Kingdom while the
six northern counties remained a British province. By excluding from the new province the three
most Catholic counties in Ulster, unionists were guaranteed a two-thirds majority over Catholics.
Still suffering from a siege mentality, partition finally made the Protestants a majority,
something they quickly translated into political, economic, and social domination.
Sides were now drawn between pro- and anti-treaty forces. Treaty supporters joined the
army of the new Free State while those who opposed it as a "sell-out" to the British fought as the
Irish Republican Army in defense of the 1916 rebellion's dream of a free republic. The IRA lost
the Civil War and went underground but in 1925 moderates led by Eamon de Valera began to
contest elections in the Free State as members of the Sinn Fein party, de Valera had been a
Commandant in the Irish Volunteers in the 1916 Uprising but his life had been spared. In 1926
J. Bowyer Bell, A Time of Terror: How Democratic Societies Respond to Revolutionary Violence (New
York: Basic Books, Inc., 1978), 206.
de Valera abandoned the abstentionist policy of Sinn Fein and formed the republican party of the
Fianna Fail. Fianna Fail members took seats on the opposition benches in the Free State in 1927
and five years later won the majority benches. They had succeeded politically where the bullet
had failed by becoming a "slightly constitutional" party.
As the Free State got on with the business of recovering from the Civil War, unionists in
Ulster got down to the business of creating a parliament of their own at their offices in Stormont
Castle. Before long they established a permanent hold on the Stormont system by intentionally
excluding nationalists. From the start Unionists did not try to legitimate their regime by
attracting the support of Catholics. Because the Ulster Parliament was virtually ignored by the
civil servants in London, politicians at Stormont were free to see that the new parliament met the
immediate needs of unionists and provided a focus for their own aspirations. In the words of the
first Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Lord Craigavon, Stormont was "a Protestant parliament
Q
for a Protestant people."
Perceived threats from the Catholic minority, the Free State, and republicans who
rejected the 1921 treaty promoted the Unionist point of view that "Protestants had been loyal to
the British Crown; therefore, only Protestants were deemed worthy of participation in
government." Protestants maintained political dominance through a virtual monopoly of
municipal jobs, housing facilities, private employment, and education—means that would have
been intolerable in Britain. Although there were unionist/loyalist mavericks and splinter parties,
some even relatively successful like the small Northern Ireland Labour Party, no one believed
that Northern Ireland would be ruled by anyone but the Unionists so long as Stormont existed.
Protestant solidarity virtually guaranteed a political stranglehold that left nationalists a
permanent minority with no hope of gaining power by peaceful constitutional means. As a
In 1927, in the wake of the assassination of the government's Minister of Justice, the Fianna Fail
representatives appeared in the Dail to take their seats as political representatives. They insisted that they
had not taken an Oath to the British monarch as all representatives were expected to, thereby making them
"slightly constitutional." Ibid., 208-209.
Q
Institute for the Study of Conflict, Northern Ireland: Problems and Perspectives (London: Institute for
the Study of Conflict: 1982), 5.
"As long as Catholics resided in Northern Ireland, they would be expected to comply with the regime's
laws; their support was neither sought nor obtained. This caste division was simple, easily understood and
entirely consistent with the Orange version of Irish history." Rose, 92-93.
While it is generally agreed that in a democratic government opposition parties have the chance to gain
power, this opportunity was nonexistent in Northern Ireland. General elections in Northern Ireland were
not real contests for power since Unionists could take victory for granted. Institute for the Study of
Conflict, Problems and Perspectives, 5, 16.
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consequence of their unassailable power Unionists grew progressively less sensitive to
nationalist criticism.
By 1920, land reform laws allowed the Catholic peasantry to own land, thus further
limiting Britain's interests in Ireland, but the success of its 17th century immigration program
prevented Britain from withdrawing altogether. At the time of the Government of Ireland Act of
1920 partition was regarded as neither permanent nor best by both unionists and nationalists, but
it was a British expedient that conveniently removed the Irish question from British politics.
The Ulster parliament sat at Stormont Castle while Westminster retained control over defense,
foreign affairs, and economic policies. There was little interaction between the two
—
partly due
to London's aversion to Irish politics and partly due to the quasi-federal character of the 1920
constitutional settlement. After 1920, London was unwilling to be drawn back into Irish politics,
so much so that from 1923 on, most political matters devolved to Northern Ireland were
forbidden to be discussed at Westminster. Over time the northern and southern parliaments
became established on an apparently permanent basis. In the north the unionists, encouraged by
conservatives in London, fostered a quasi-national feeling. Catholics on the other hand, and
nationalists in particular, continued to regard partition as temporary and the cause of the political
and social inequities.
In 1949 the Free State transformed itself into the Republic of Ireland. Even though the
1949 Act affirmed that Ulster would remain a part of the United Kingdom so long as the Ulster
parliament and the majority of the people wished it, Protestants were anxious knowing that
Westminster had the power to change the constitutional framework of Ulster at any time
—
"because of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, Stormont could not be entrenched."
Using their majority power Unionists created Draconian 'lop-sided' policies with heavy
emphasis on coercive powers, relatively obtrusive security forces, and denial of ordinary civil
rights to the Catholic community. In Unionist eyes this was justified by the uncertain
allegiance of northern nationalists to the Northern Ireland state. Unionist fears were further
exacerbated by rhetoric from the Republic about an inevitable united Ireland. The fact that two
articles in the Republic's constitution laid claim to sovereignty over the entire island escalated
12
Ibid., 5.
13 Max Beloff and Gillian Peele, The Government ofthe United Kingdom: Political Authority in a
Changing Society (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1980), 285.
14




unionist certainty about plans for reunification, plans that if successful would once again relegate
Protestants to a distinct minority within a Catholic state.
12
III. 1969-1976: THE ABOLITION OF STORMONT AND
THE NORTHERN IRELAND EXECUTIVE
Ignored by London for fifty years, unionist domination of the political and social life in
Northern Ireland bred the seeds of its own destruction. Lack of consensus from its citizens made
the Northern Ireland system unique in western democracies but by the late 1960s even Ulster
was being swept up in the world-wide tide of civil rights activists and youthful protesters. When
Catholic and Protestant violence couldn't be controlled, the administration of the province was
turned over to "direct rule." On New Year's Day 1974 the first attempt was made to fill the gap
in self-governance and forge a political peace. The power-sharing Northern Ireland executive
and all-Ireland Council were groundbreaking experiments, bringing Catholics and Protestants
together on an equal footing in the hallowed halls of government. Although the 1973 attempt
failed, it is the basis for every serious attempt at peace since 1974. Just as the Northern Ireland
assembly, executive, and Council of Ireland tried to improve the Stormont system, so too have
the many successive attempts at peace since 1974 been better versions of this one.
A. BREAKDOWN IN ORDER: THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND
THE BRITISH ARMY
The veneer of Northern Irish society that coated almost fifty years of Protestant
domination cracked in the late 1960s when Catholic frustration with their lack of participation in
the government found a voice in civil rights organizations and marches. The civil rights
movement that began in 1968 was not motivated by notions of a united Ireland. Rather,
protesters wanted to reform the political, economic, and social discrimination within the existing
system, not tear it down. Ironically, right-wing loyalists and unionists insisted that every
challenge to discriminatory practices was an attack upon the entire structure of the state. The
civil rights movement borrowed freely from the American civil rights campaign and theories of
non-violence, but peaceful demonstrations were met by hostile Protestant opponents and quickly
turned violent. Britain hesitated to become involved until the deepening crisis threatened total
collapse of the Northern Ireland system.
16
Jack Holland, Too Long a Sacrifice: Life and Death in Northern Ireland Since 1969 (New York:
Dodd, Mead & Company, 1981), 34.
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Every year during the summer months Protestants and Catholics replay their most
victorious moments in history with over 2500 exclusively sectarian parades. Waving banners
and shouting insults, the more aggressive Protestant parade routes intentionally run through
Catholic neighborhoods with the purpose of antagonizing the residents. On 12 August 1969 the
annual march in Derry that commemorates the defeat of James's II troops turned into the worst
violence since the 1920s. Catholics stoned the marchers, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (the
RUC, the provincial police force made up primarily of Protestants) charged with batons. A riot
ensued that spread from Derry to Belfast to Dungannon and killed 5 Catholics and 2 Protestants.
The Republic set up refugee camps and field hospitals along the border and requested
that a United Nations peace-keeping force be sent to Ulster. The peace-keeping idea was
quashed by the British government who insisted that the problem would be dealt with as an
internal affair. Prior to the Derry riot, as the civil rights movement escalated, Britain hoped that
an improved and evenhanded law and order policy would solve all problems, but the violence
during and after the Derry riots proved too much. At the request of the prime minister of
Northern Ireland, James Chichester-Clark, British army troops marched into Ulster on the eve of
14 August to support the civil power. The entrance of the troops was an admission that fifty
years of Unionist hegemony did not result in their control of the territory because the people
trusted neither the politicians nor the police. More important, but less obvious at the time,
sending in the troops questioned the very basis of the constitutional settlement whereby Britain
ruled the North at arm's length and Stormont retained responsibility for internal law and order.
It weakened the union instead of strengthening it and forced the issue of a constitutional review
that neither Stormont nor Westminster was prepared or willing to undertake.
B. REBIRTH OF THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY
The Irish Republican Army dates back to the rise of secret societies in Ireland in the late
1700s. The modern IRA is associated with the 1916 Easter Uprising in Dublin. After failed
campaigns against partition most IRA leaders were imprisoned during the 1950s. When they
were released in the early 1960s the organization was nearly extinct. Ironically, the absence of
the IRA during and after the Derry riots resurrected the organization.
Downey, 57.
14
Before 1969 old guard leaders of the IRA began to incorporate a Marxist political
ideology into the organization. The violent crackdown of the Derry protest convinced some
members that because of the new left-wing influence the IRA could not provide Catholics with
either physical protection or civil rights reforms. The IRA's embarrassing absence during the
Derry riots prompted graffiti in Catholic ghettos that read "IRA—I Ran Away," but the incident
on the whole showed "a total breakdown of Catholic confidence in the state and its forces of law
and order. Such alienation was required to give moral authority to those within the IRA who
wanted to return to the gun."
Made up mostly of younger and newer members, internal rebels broke away from the
Official IRA and formed the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA or Provos). The
Provisionals gained public support by promoting themselves as "defenders of the Catholics" and
turning Catholic distrust of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the British army to their
advantage. Although the goal to unite Ireland remained the same for both the Provisional and
the Official wings of the organization, the Provos, reminiscent of the United Irishmen, called for
19
violence to fulfill republican goals. The fissure between the Provos and the Officials was an
20
irrevocable one over the spirit of the revolution.
C. THE END OF THE STORMONT PARLIAMENT
In return for the commitment of troops, Chichester-Clark committed his government to
implementing a set of reforms. The reform package disbanded the "B-Specials" (a Protestant
militia that acted as a police reserve force), and replaced them with a unit of the British Army
known as the Ulster Defence Regiment; brought in commanders from mainland Britain to reform
the recruitment and training of the RUC; installed a senior official from the Foreign Office to
promote good relations with the Republic; redrew the gerrymandered municipal government of
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allocation of public housing by local councils which in Protestant towns had been flagrantly
discriminatory; and outlawed discrimination in private employment.
In 1970 a new Northern Ireland political party called the Social Democratic and Labour
Party (SDLP) was formed from leaders of the civil rights movement and remnants of the
disintegrating Nationalist Party. By dropping the traditional abstentionist policy of Catholic
nationalists, the SDLP tried to participate in the governance of Northern Ireland. The SDLP was
committed to "constitutional nationalism" and represented the changing nature ofNorthern
Ireland Catholic society by attracting younger, inquisitive, and optimistic members. In June
1971 Chichester-Clark's replacement, Brian Faulkner of the Ulster Unionist Party, proposed
three new parliamentary committees, of which at least two would be chaired by members of an
opposition party. At first, in its role as moderate opposition, the SDLP approved of the plan, but
continued skirmishes between the army and Catholics in Derry forced it to announce on 16 July
that they were withdrawing from Stormont and setting up their own alternative assembly.
One month later, in an attempt to stop the wholesale violence of the paramilitaries,
Faulkner instituted the practice of internment without trial. Internment was not a new security
measure for Ireland and had been used with success against the IRA during its bombing
campaign in the late 1950s. This attempt, however, was a disaster from the very beginning. On
9 August 1971 army patrols, empowered under the Special Powers Act, swept through Catholic
ghettos to arrest anyone "acting in a manner prejudicial to the peace and maintenance of order."
In the initial sweeps between 9 August and 14 December 1971, the RUC charged 342 men,
interned a total of 1 576 people, and later released 934 without charge. From the start it was
obvious that the army patrols were working with inaccurate and out-of-date intelligence—instead
of active IRA members the RUC arrested moderate civil rights activists, young socialists, and
outspoken intellectuals. Someone from almost every Catholic family in Belfast and Derry was
interned but very few Protestants were rounded up. Worse, reports soon spread about abuse in
the prisons, including illegal interrogation techniques. The situation dissolved into chaos that
only magnified the violence and internment became the IRA's most powerful recruiting and
propaganda weapon.
From 1969 to 1972 it appeared increasingly bizarre to Westminster for British troops to
implement Stormont's apparently ineffective security policy. In January 1972 the British
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government reached its limit with a fiasco known as Bloody Sunday. In early January the
Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) began to plan an anti-internment
demonstration in Deny. Local RUC authorities advised the government to let the demonstration
alone and to arrest its leaders afterwards, but the government ceded to Protestant militants'
demands for a show of force and called in a special squadron of the British army. On
30 January 1972 British paratroopers shot into a crowd of unarmed civil rights demonstrators in
Derry, killing 14. In full view of world media the province erupted into uncontrollable sectarian
warfare.
On 22 March British Prime Minister Edward Heath informed Faulkner that Westminster
was taking over security in the province. Two days later Heath prorogued Stormont. In April
1972 Westminster suspended the Stormont parliament and assumed control under direct rule.
The suspension of Stormont established the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) headed by a Secretary
of State for Northern Ireland who is charged with dealing with political and constitutional
matters, security, police, and criminal justice policy. To political analysts, "The suspension of
Stormont was seen by many not as a temporary solution to Ulster's problems but as an admission
that a form of government which had so patently failed to build up the support of a consensus
22
had to be replaced." To nationalists, the suspension prompted optimism that whatever type of
government filled Stormont' s gap would finally grant them a political voice in the administration
of the province. To unionists, the suspension augured further appeasement of Catholic demands
by more drastic Westminster reforms and was a betrayal of their British loyalties for it stripped
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them of their hard-earned authority.
D. THE NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY AND THE SUNNINGDALE
AGREEMENT
1972 was bloody, exhausting, and chaotic; 1973 dawned with hopes of returning some
degree of peace and order to the province. After direct rule was imposed the remainder of 1972
was used by the army to clear and calm the streets. 1972 holds two dubious distinctions: the
highest number of deaths and the highest number of British troops. Over 25,000 troops were
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clear neighborhood "no-go" barriers.
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While Operation Motorman met almost no resistance and
resulted in only one fatal casualty, it completed the picture of Northern Ireland as an occupied
25
country, and Belfast in particular as an occupied city.
When the administration ofjustice and internal security in Northern Ireland reverted to
Westminster the internal constitutional structure ofNorthern Ireland was in a state of confusion.
Ulster's constitutional position within the United Kingdom, as well as the structure and
organization of the judiciary and police force, were essentially unchanged, but a crisis developed
over the proper construction of a constitutional order. The crisis that developed which remains
unsolved—the circle that needs to be squared—is finding a framework for self-governance in the
province that will be supported by both nationalists and unionists.
The first steps that set up the fundamentals for a new devolved government with
executive powers were proposed in the Northern Ireland Constitution Act of 1973 and the
Northern Ireland Assembly Act of 1973. The acts provided for an Assembly elected by
proportional representation (instead of the customary first-past-the-post) with law-making
powers and heads of departments who would be grouped into an Executive. The Northern
Ireland Constitution Act divided the Assembly's legislative powers into three matters. The
Assembly could not substantively legislate on excepted matters—national issues such as the
Crown and Parliament, defense, and taxation. With the consent of the Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland, and subject to the veto of Parliament, the Assembly could legislate on reserved
matters—issues concerning law and order. Finally, the Assembly was free to legislate on
transferred matters—mainly economic and social matters for which Northern Irish departments
were established.
In August 1972 the Northern Ireland Secretary, William Whitelaw, invited all
constitutional parties in Northern Ireland to open a dialogue regarding the future of the province.
Representatives attended from the Alliance Party, Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP), and
Ulster Unionist Party. The men agreed to three points: the province would remain a part of the
United Kingdom for as long as the majority so wished; a provincial assembly and administration
would be created; and closer cooperation between the Republic and the province in social and
economic matters would be promoted. Towards these ends a Green Paper was released by the
"No-go" areas had become sections of Catholic ghettos where the RUC could not safely conduct patrols.





Northern Ireland Office on 30 October entitled, The Future ofNorthern Ireland. The paper
outlined London's plans for the province that hinged upon two concepts: a new assembly with
members from Catholic and Protestant political parties to share the power of an executive with
devolved powers, and the "Irish dimension," that is, the inclusion of the Republic in the future of
Northern Ireland.
Elections for the new Assembly were held on 28 June 1973. Of the 78 seats available
the SDLP won 19, Alliance 8, and the Northern Ireland Labour Party 1, thus totaling 28 pro-
power-sharing votes; in the middle, Brian Faulkner's unionists won 22 seats; and the anti-
assembly loyalist coalition and anti-Faulkner unionists totaled 28. When the first four parties
were combined there were enough pro-assembly votes to assure a power-sharing majority, but it
meant that the future of the executive depended upon the cooperation of moderate nationalists
and unionists.
By August London was impatient with the lack of progress by Belfast politicians to
establish a workable assembly and executive. Warning that they must make rapid and
constructive moves towards a political solution, Prime Minister Edward Heath restated London's
attitude that "politicians in Northern Ireland should run their own affairs" and that "if a vacuum
was left because of a failure to set up an effective political structure it would cause difficulties
for the British Government." During talks in Belfast with the Northern Ireland political leaders,
Mr. Heath directed them to consider the divisive questions of law and order, internment, the
Council of Ireland, and army behavior towards the Catholic community. At the talks Heath also
assured unionists that the question of law and order and security rested with Westminster, that
there would be no change on "constitutional questions" (i.e., the union was secure), and that
there would be no reorganization of the RUC, although changes could be made within the
force.
Heath's talks with Belfast politicians had been part of a historic trip to the Republic of
Ireland—the first time a British prime minister had visited to the 26 counties since 1922. Dublin
interpreted the trip as "a token of the seriousness with which the United Kingdom Government is
treating the Irish Republic dimension of the Northern Ireland problem." Despite the goodwill
gesture, Britain and Dublin disagreed about when to link the north and south through the Council
of Ireland. Heath emphasized the establishment of the executive before the Council, while
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Dublin and the SDLP felt that the formation of an Ulster executive and a Council of Ireland
should happen at the same time "in an effort to build a normal society in the north." Moreover,
Dublin wanted to make sure that the council would be invested with "real power" and the
28
opportunity to evolve.
By September 1973 more obstacles were presented: it seemed that even the moderate
unionists and nationalists were raising intractable conditions to participation. Unionists raised
questions about the Republic's extradition policy and acceptance of the constitutional position of
Northern Ireland; the SDLP threatened that it would only participate in the executive if progress
was made on the issues of internment, the Council of Ireland, and reforms to the Royal Ulster
Constabulary. Finally, after six months of negotiations, a "two-tier compromise" was announced
for the formation of an executive between the Unionist, SDLP, and Alliance parties. According
to the compromise, six Unionists, four SDLP and one Alliance member would hold voting rights
(giving the Unionists a majority), while an additional Unionist, two SDLP and one Alliance
member would take up posts without voting rights (thus preventing the Unionists from having an
overall majority in membership on the 1 1 man executive). Part of the agreement was that the
executive designate would not go into operation until the governments of the United Kingdom
and Ireland met with Northern Ireland party leaders to clarify the forms and functions of the
Council of Ireland.
In a debate in the House of Commons following the agreement, the Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland, William Whitelaw, explained that formal establishment of the executive
depended upon the Council of Ireland because it had been a crucial part of the SDLP's
compromise. Furthermore, Whitelaw explained that it was acceptable to the United Kingdom
government that the council be confined to representatives from the North and South—no
representatives from Westminster. Displeased with the arrangements, anti-assembly unionists
and loyalists immediately demanded fresh discussions on the future government. Although
divided amongst themselves into a number of splinter groups, anti-power-sharing unionists
planned a conference to develop a program of opposition because "This whole thing is a step
nearer the South. ..The loyalists will have a United policy. ..We see eye to eye on the great issues
which united the people of Northern Ireland in 1912 and 1920."29
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In December, one month before the Executive was scheduled to convene, representatives
from the British and Irish governments, members of the Northern Ireland Executive designate,
and advisers from the various Northern Ireland parties met for four days at Sunningdale to plan
the Council of Ireland. At Sunningdale British Prime Minister Heath outlined five questions to
be dealt with: the Irish government's recognition of the constitutional status of Northern Ireland;
extradition and an all-Ireland common law enforcement area; political control of the police;
powers and functions of the Council of Ireland; and provisions for the finance and operation of
the Executive. On the first issue, two statements were issued side-by-side, one saying that
Britain would support the majority if they wished to become a part of a united Ireland, the other
saying that the Irish government recognized there could be no change in the constitutional status
of the north without the consent of the majority. No agreement was reached on extradition and
common law enforcement so a Commission of Jurists was suggested to consider proposals and
report back at a later time. Control of the police was given to a new Northern Ireland Police
Authority appointed by the Secretary of State.
Agreement on the powers and functions of the Council of Ireland were achieved fairly
easily by avoiding detail and keeping to clearly defined topics. Areas of common interest to
Belfast and Dublin to be studied further included natural resources, agriculture, trade and
industry, electricity generation, tourism, roads and transport, public heath, and sports, culture and
arts. Provisions for the financing of the Council would come from grants by both sovereign
governments and studies would be made to find other forms of finance to apply beyond the
initial period of operation. The formal Sunningdale Agreement would be signed later in 1974
after further discussions about some technical aspects and ratification by the Assembly and the
Irish parliament.
Unionist participants at Sunningdale made sure that some of their concerns were
addressed. The Council was to consist of members of the Northern Ireland Executive and the
government of the Republic and would have executive power over devolved subjects. A second
consultative tier would be drawn from the Republic's House of Commons (the Dail) and the
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Northern Ireland Assembly. The Council would work on the basis of unanimity to ensure that
Northern Ireland interests could not be overruled by the Republic and unionists would not feel
that they were being pressured into a United Ireland.
It was undeniable to moderates that progress had been made although there was still hard
work ahead on some very contentious topics. Outstanding issues included the Irish
constitutional claim to the Northern Ireland territory, the Republic's and the SDLP's insistence
that policing in Northern Ireland be reformed to standards acceptable to the Catholic minority,
and the matter of extradition whereby anyone in the Republic wanted for an offense associated
with the IRA is handed across the border. Overall, though, nationalist participants at the
conference were pleased with the plans; their biggest concern was the ability of Brian Faulkner
and his party to sell the package to the unionist electorate, especially in the face of rising loyalist
hostility.
E. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND EXECUTIVE
When sworn in on 1 January 1974, members of the executive took an oath of loyalty not
to the British Crown but to "uphold the laws of Northern Ireland and conscientiously fulfill as a
member of the Northern Ireland executive my duties under the Constitution Act, 1973, in the
interests of Northern Ireland and its people." Considering the displeasure with which
Protestants greeted the plans for power-sharing and the Sunningdale Agreement, a backlash of
violence was expected from paramilitaries. Four days after the executive took office anti-
Council of Ireland pressure within the Unionist party forced Brian Faulkner to resign as its
leader. Gathering his supporters around him, Faulkner faced the daunting task of leading the
executive and moderate Protestants while incurring the wrath of loyalists.
The future of the executive depended in no small part on the Dublin government of
William Cosgrave. A cooperative Cosgrave could stabilize Faulkner and the executive by
producing an extradition agreement and formally recognizing the north as a part of the United
Kingdom. Faulkner could be further supported if the SDLP moderated its outspoken opinions
about the necessity of the Council of Ireland. A cooperative Assembly was also critical because
the power-sharing majority would crumble without the SDLP and Alliance members. Therefore,
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in the face of anti-power-sharing opposition within the Assembly, Faulkner "...had to gamble on
calling in liberal support [from the SDLP and Alliance] to save the day for sensible Unionism."3
Before January was over Protestant militants, led by Ian Paisley, disrupted the assembly
and led a loyalist walkout. More dangerous than the disruption was the possibility of Paisley and
other militant leaders encouraging violence by the extremists in the loyalist community. In
March the support Faulkner needed from Dublin appeared unlikely when the Republic's
Supreme Court declared that the status of Ulster in the Sunningdale Agreement was a recognition
of Ulster as a part of the United Kingdom, but it did not imply legal acceptance of it as such.
Faulkner refused to work for further progress on the Council of Ireland until Dublin "accepted
the right of the people of Northern Ireland to determine their own future."
While Cosgrave and Faulkner argued, Britain prepared for a general election. Ulster had
traditionally been a bastion of Conservative party support, but since the imposition of direct rule,
loyalists distrusted the British government. To court loyalists, Conservatives campaigned in
Northern Ireland with pledges to preserve the union at all cost. Loyalists opposed to the
executive planned to use the election as a referendum on the Sunningdale Agreement and the
executive. The loyalist coalition landslide amounted to an electoral rejection of power-sharing
and the Council of Ireland. At their victory rally loyalists outlined their demands: new elections
to the assembly, the end of power-sharing, and rejection of the Council of Ireland.
In May the Northern Ireland assembly voted 44 to 28 in favor of the Sunningdale
Agreement. Because the SDLP and Dublin would neither abandon nor modify plans for the
Council of Ireland, ratification of Sunningdale was the executive's death knell. In a surprising
display of unity, loyalist parties and worker's unions coordinated a devastating general strike in
protest that lasted two weeks and brought Ulster to its knees. The executive was suspended, the
province returned to direct rule, and Brian Faulkner dissolved the executive with the words: "It
is. ..apparent to us, from the extent of support for the present stoppage, that the degree of consent
needed to sustain the executive does not exist at present. Nor, as Ulstermen, are we prepared to
see our country undergo, for any political reason, the catastrophe which now confronts it."
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F. ONE LAST TRY
There would be one more attempt at a negotiated peace in 1974 with what came to be
known as the Feakle peace initiative. Feakle was an attempt by Protestant clergymen to
understand the IRA instead of attacking them. On 20 December 1974 representatives from the
Provisional leadership arrived at a non-descript hotel in the small town of Feakle to meet with
representatives of the Protestant religious community. On 22 December the Provos declared a
twelve-day cease-fire. Merlyn Rees, the current Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, said that
the British government "should not be found wanting in its response" if the cease-fire proved
genuine and sustained. The cease-fire was extended to 16 January and the Protestant and
Provisional participants continued to talk.
After the first cease-fire lapsed a second one was announced on 9 February. The British
government erected a number of "incident centers" around Ulster as bases for local political and
community involvement and to monitor the cease-fire. On 10 February the army was directed to
"keep a low profile." The cease-fire lasted until October, finally ending because the two sides
wanted different things: the IRA demanded a formal British declaration of intent to withdraw
from Ireland; the British wanted, and got, a respite from Provisional harassment of the security
forces.
In the wake of the Sunningdale rejection, the British government hoped to bring together
various factions in a new Constitutional Convention. Elections to the convention were held on
1 May 1975, but anti-Sunningdale loyalists won 47 seats to 31. In reality, "...the British could
not really have expected a 'convention' held in the wake of Sunningdale 's collapse to do what
Sunningdale could not, but it provided at least a political figleaf to cover the real lack of will and
hopelessness, where Ireland was concerned..." The Convention convened in May 1975 and
after completing its initial report in November was reconvened in January 1976. It was
dissolved two months later when no agreement could be reached on a satisfactory system of
government to implement.
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IV. 1977-1996: THE JOINT DECLARATION AND THE IRA CEASE-FIRE
As John Finn explained in an examination of the Northern Ireland crisis: "the process of
constitutional reconstruction requires not the restoration of a constitution or a constitutional
order.. .but rather promotion of the conditions which nonviolent, reasoned debate about the
proper reconstruction of a constitutional community can proceed..."37 The promotion of
reasoned debate was the goal of the 1993 attempt at peace. Much had happened in the 20 years
since the ignoble end of the power-sharing executive—none more significant than the inclusion
of the Republic and the United States in the peace process and the successful politicization of the
Irish Republican Army. Both of these events, while not changing the nature of the conflict or
proposed solutions, expanded and shifted the direction of the search for peace.
A. REPUBLICAN HUNGER STRIKES AND THE RISE OF SINN FEIN
In 1977 the Provisional IRA leadership conceded that their struggle to drive the British
from Ulster would take decades. The PIRA restated their intention to make the province
ungovernable by sapping the will of the British government and public and to make the Catholic
community more dependent on the IRA by alienating them from existing institutions. To
increase the effectiveness of their campaign the Provisionals underwent a radical strategic and
philosophical reorganization, declaring that they would take two approaches—a "long way" and
an "open way"—to achieve their goal of British expulsion. The long way approach centered
around preparing for years of insurgency and revamping the traditional but vulnerable army of
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brigades and battalions into the revolutionary cell structure. The open way resulted in the
creation of the Provisional Sinn Fein political party to pursue a political struggle and offer
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people an alternative to violence.
Finn, 5.
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The reorganization of the PIRA and the rise of a political wing is the direct result of
changes in the British attitude towards fighting political violence. Between 1975 and 1976 the
British government refocused their security policy by repealing internment and special category
status.
40
In their place the British instituted two new policies for the security forces in Northern
Ireland known as "criminalization" and "Ulsterization." Under the concept of criminalization all
offenses, no matter their motive, are considered criminal acts and as such are subject to sanction
in criminal courts. The policy was intended to neutralize terrorism by refusing to grant special
status to political crimes. The success of criminalization was the slow replacement of military
personnel by local police in northern communities known as "Ulsterization." However, as
internment without trial was discontinued, it became practically impossible to convict suspected
terrorists without enough legal and proper evidence. To achieve criminalization Britain erected
an apparatus of intelligence gathering, special legislation, and modified courts that drew
criticism from civil rights activists and made Northern Ireland one of the most policed societies
in the free world.
Criminalization and the repeal of special category status had a tremendous impact within
the prison system and, unexpectedly, an even greater impact on the political system. As a
precondition to an IRA cease-fire and talks between the IRA and the British government in 1972,
special category status was granted to members of the IRA and other "political" prisoners and
internees. Special category status gave the prisoners some control of the prison system and was
of immense propaganda value to the IRA for it allowed them to describe the conflict on their
own terms—they were an army finishing the business of the 1916 Uprising and P.O.W. status
meant that the British government accepted the legitimacy of their cause. But with the policy
of criminalization, the British government changed the context of the conflict by redefining it in
terms of law and order. Militant republicans were called terrorists and stripped of any political
dimension to their actions. Anything suggesting that there was a war going on was revamped or
In 1975 the government ended the policy of internment for two reasons: the first was in an attempt to
normalize relations with the Catholic community, the second was in recognition that internment could no
longer be justified as a short-term security expedient while waiting for a long-term political settlement that
was obviously not forth-coming. Adrian Guelke, "The Ballot Bomb", in Political Parties and Terrorist
Groups. (London, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1992), 106-107.
Special category status allowed prisoners to live in separate prison compounds according to their
paramilitary allegiance, wear their own clothes, drill, hold classes, and behave in most respects like
prisoners of war. O'Malley, 48.






replaced, including the reduction of the role of the army and emphasis put on "normal
policing.
When special category status was eliminated for anyone convicted after March 1976,
prisoners immediately protested. The first person convicted under the new rules refused to wear
the prison uniform and draped himself in the prison blanket. By September 1976 close to 450
prisoners were "on the blanket." Over the next four years the blanket protest escalated into the
"dirty protest" when prisoners refused to wash and smeared their excrement on cell walls or
shoved it beneath cell doors. By 1980 the protesters had three choices: escalate their protest,
continue the dirty protest indefinitely, or end it.
On 27 October 1980 seven prisoners chose to escalate the protest by starting a hunger
strike. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said that there would be no concessions from
the government because there was no such thing as political murder. The strike was called off on
18 December but another begun on 1 March 1981 that captured the attention of the world.
Initially the second strike had little public enthusiasm, until the nationalist MP for Fermanagh-
South Tyrone died unexpectedly. Family members of the hunger strikers organized single-
subject elections revolving around prison conditions and nominated the leader of the strike,
Bobby Sands, for the Fermanagh-South Tyrone seat. Sands' supporters campaigned on the
theme that electing him would save his life because no Prime Minister would allow a member of
Parliament to die from starvation. On 9 April Sands was elected to Westminster but the British
government continued to refuse to make any concessions.
By the time the hunger strike ended on 3 October 1981, ten men, including Bobby Sands,
had died. Although the prisoners had not achieved the reinstallation of special category status,
the groundswell of public support in the nationalist community for their campaign had
immediate and long-term consequences for the path of the peace process. Recognizing the
potential to turn the public disgust with perceived British hard-heartedness into electoral
victories, in September 1981 the Provos endorsed Sinn Fein's run for a West Belfast seat in the
next Westminster parliamentary general election. The announcement was accompanied by
assurances that entering the political fray would complement, not displace, the armed struggle.
The Provisional leadership had to carefully explain that by contesting elections it was not






As intelligence agents of the British and Irish governments improved their skills and
cooperated with each other, the IRA's campaign of violence became more difficult to execute
and sustain. Furthermore, the IRA realized that it could not survive if violence isolated them
from the mass of nationalists. To gain broad nationalist support, leaders in Sinn Fein decided
that the effectiveness of the Provo campaign could be jeopardized by the movement's political
isolation. In minimizing their isolation, however, the Provos faced a serious dilemma—they had
historically rejected the use of constitutional means in favor of the physical force tradition and
had characterized constitutional means as subservient to its military campaign. They now had to
explain to the militant physical force proponents that this turn to the constitutional electoral
process would ultimately strengthen their movement by attracting civilians who would otherwise
hesitate to join or support the PIRA.
B. THE 1985 ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT
In 1981 Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's Secretary of State for Northern Ireland,
James Prior, tried to break the political impasse in the province by enacting legislation for a new
Northern Ireland Assembly—the first assembly since 1975 and the most ambitious plan since
power-sharing. Not surprisingly, Sinn Fein boycotted the Assembly, but so did the SDLP. The
SDLP refused to join the Assembly when two conditions were not met: a guaranteed power-
sharing arrangement with the unionist parties, and some institutional recognition by Britain of
the Republic's role in the governance of the north. Without any nationalist support the assembly
lacked any real weight or significance for the two years it operated.
In response to Prior's assembly the SDLP announced that it was going to form an
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interparty conference with the three major parties of the Republic to set forth their ideas of
what a united Ireland would look like and the political, constitutional, legal, and economic
changes that unification would demand. The New Ireland Forum met from May 1983 to March
1984 when it published a report outlining three possible models for a "new" Ireland: a unitary
state governed from Dublin; a federation or confederation of the two parts of Ireland; or some
form ofjoint authority in which Britain and Ireland share in the governance of the north.
Margaret Thatcher left no doubt about the reaction of the British Government: "I have made it
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Fianna Fail, Fine Gael, and Labour parties participated in the New Ireland Forum. Unionist and Alliance
parties turned down their invitations.
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quite clear.. .that a unified Ireland was one thing that was out. A second solution was a
confederation system: that was out. A third solution was joint authority: that is out."49
In the aftermath of the hunger strikes Sinn Fein increased their electoral base so much
that the SDLP feared Sinn Fein would replace them as the leader of the moderate nationalist
community. The SDLP had legitimate fears—in the 1982 general election Sinn Fein won 10.1 %
of the vote while the SDLP won only 18.8 % of first preference votes, and the Alliance Party
only 9.3%. The Sinn Fein breakthrough shocked mainland public opinion who believed the
terrorists could not secure popular support. While Bobby Sands' victory had been surprising, it
was considered by most people in Britain as an aberration, based as it was upon the single issue
of prison conditions. Sinn Fein's continued success not only puzzled analysts but frightened
them, since Sinn Fein urged their supporters to consider elections "violence by other means."5
Sinn Fein's vote increased in the 1983 general elections, again to the detriment of the
SDLP. In light of Sinn Fein's success in 1983, Thatcher finally understood Dublin's insistence
that something had to be done about the north "before Sinn Fein made irreversible gains and
displaced the SDLP as the political spokesman for a majority of northern Catholics."51 By 1985
Sinn Fein had partially abandoned its abstentionist policy, announcing that any member elected
to local councils could take up their seats. By June 1985 Thatcher signaled to the Irish Prime
Minister (Taoiseach), Garrett Fitzgerald, that she was prepared to talk.
Coupled with Sinn Fein's success was the failure of Prior's assembly, made
inconsequential by unionist unwillingness to share power with the SDLP. It was clear to the
British that any change to the dynamics in Northern Ireland would have to come from an inter-
governmental agreement with Dublin. In a nutshell, "throughout nearly a generation of crisis,
the unionist people and their leaders have been unable to grasp the point that either they would
have to come to terms with the SDLP at the regional level or face some kind of intervention by
the government in Dublin on behalf of the nationalist minority.. .In this sense, the 1985
agreement is an expression of British exasperation with the stubbornness and sterility of the
unionist position." The Anglo-Irish Agreement signed on 15 November 1985 between Prime
Ministers Margaret Thatcher and Garrett Fitzgerald was purposefully vague, for it was a
document of intentions, not actions. Nevertheless, its twelve articles, the first plan for Northern
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Ireland formulated with no input from unionists, signaled that the Republic was a major
participant in developing a political solution for the north. In brief, the Anglo-Irish Agreement
stated that:
• A change in the status of Northern Ireland will come only with the consent of the majority of
the people of Northern Ireland. If in the future the majority clearly wishes for a change and
consent to a united Ireland, legislation will be introduced in the British and Irish parliaments
to "give effect" to that wish.
• An Inter-governmental Conference will be established between the two parts of Ireland to
deal on a regular basis with political matters; security and related matters; legal matters,
including the administration ofjustice; and the promotion of cross-border cooperation.
• The Conference shall be a framework within which the Irish Government may put forward
views and proposals on how to bring about devolution within Northern Ireland in so far as
they relate to the interests of the minority community. If sustained devolution should prove
impossible to achieve the Conference shall be a framework within which the Irish
Government may, where the interest of the minority community are significantly or especially
affected, put forward views on proposals for major legislation and on major policy issues.
• The Irish Government may put forward views and proposals on the role and composition of
bodies appointed by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland or Departments concerning
human rights, fair employment, and the conduct and administration of the police.
• The Conference shall consider how to improve relations between the security forces and the
community (especially making security forces more readily accepted by the nationalist
community), and policy issues relating to prisons.
• The Conference shall deal with issues relating to the enforcement of criminal law, in
particular how some areas of criminal law may be harmonized between the North and South.
The Conference may consider the issues of mixed courts in both jurisdiction, extradition and
extra-territorial jurisdiction.
• The two Governments shall cooperate to promote the economic and social development of the
areas that "have suffered most severely from the consequences of the instability of recent
years, and shall consider the possibility of securing international support for this work."
Through the Anglo-Irish Agreement the British planned to (1) involve the Irish
Government more closely and constructively in the crisis management of the North; (2) mobilize
Dublin in improved security cooperation, especially in a more coordinated anti-terrorist strategy
that included easier extradition between the two countries; (3) significantly affect the Sinn Fein
vote by promoting Dublin's role as advocate of Catholics' interests in Northern Ireland; and (4)
make the Unionists a "sadder and wiser people, more willing to consider compromise" if their
inevitable protests against the agreement failed.
The strength of the Agreement lay in that it was difficult to overthrow. Unlike the
power-sharing executive, it did not require unionist cooperation for success and there was no
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tangible, local target for Unionist dissidents. It intended to encourage the political parties in
Northern Ireland to form a coalition government along the lines of the 1974 Executive—if
Unionists dreaded Dublin's intervention in their affairs, their ideal solution was to return to
power-sharing. Extremist elements of Ulster Unionism rejected it out of hand and thus helped
Britain achieve its goal of isolating Ulster Unionism. In 1987 an IRA bomb attack at a
Protestant Remembrance Day service killed 1 1 and injured 63, but the attack was regarded as "a
personal and human tragedy of the kind that happened in Northern Ireland, " not as an assault
upon Unionists and their traditions. Interpreted as the natural consequence of intransigent
unionism, the "...murders could even be blamed, in part at least, on those Unionists whose
refusal to compromise had now reaped its own terrible harvest. The people slain at Enniskillen
were the victims of Unionist ideology."
On 26 March the Irish government and the Northern Ireland Secretary of State, Peter
Brooke, announced that they and the four main constitutional parties of Northern Ireland had
agreed on a basis for formal talks to address the issues of transferring substantial power and
responsibility to locally elected representatives. In fits and starts the talks lasted from 17 June
1991 to 10 November 1992. The talks proceeded along three "strands": Strand I discussed the
relationship between the people ofNorthern Ireland and the Westminster Parliament; Strand II
discussed relationships between the people of Ireland, north and south; and Strand III discussed
future relationships between nationalists and unionists. The talks were the first time since 1920
that the two Governments and representatives of all the major constitutional parties in Northern
Ireland sat down together and tried to work out the political future ofNorthern Ireland. When
the Unionists signaled they were willing to talk to Dublin politicians about Strand II, they
indicated that they wanted to end the political exile unionism had been in since 1985.
C. THE 1993 DOWNING STREET DECLARATION
Part of the impetus for the Anglo-Irish Agreement was to stem the flow of support for
Sinn Fein. Results from the 1986 election appeared to show that it worked—SDLP candidates
campaigned in support of the agreement and their combined vote rose 19% above the level
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"sellout" to the British, dropped 25 percent. In 1993, back on its feet as the leading nationalist
party, the SDLP broke tradition and started meeting with Gerry Adams, the president of Sinn
Fein. Adams and John Hume, the leader of the SDLP, first met in 1988 to see if there was any
common ground on a settlement. They resumed their contact in April 1993 at a time when Gerry
Adams was in a difficult position "feeling the strain of maintaining [Sinn Fein's] dual role as
revolutionary Republican party and seeker after a popular electoral mandate that would vindicate
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its claim that its strength rested on the democratic will of the people." Adams and Hume were
interested in constructing a "broader, deeper, sustainable political consensus." They wanted their
dialogue to be seen as part of the wider nationalist dialogue, but for Adams, it was a way to
legitimize Sinn Fein as a political player since he was pointedly excluded from the three-strand
talks process.
While the Hume-Adams meetings were public knowledge, by March 1993 the British
government was secretly meeting with leading Sinn Fein representatives. Although the Anglo-
Irish Agreement had strengthened support for constitutional nationalism and received
international support, Britain's overall directionless policy after the three strand talks failed to
produce a substantial plan for the future, threatened to leave a vacuum that they feared Hume and
Adams would fill. To prevent this, the British and Irish governments issued a joint statement in
October 1993 reiterating that the majority in the North must support a constitutional change, that
change could not be achieved through violence, and that the renunciation of violence would
result in an imaginative response from the two governments.
The two governments had reviewed a report of the Hume-Adams dialogue but believed
that any impetus for change must be introduced jointly by the governments. On 15 December
1993 the Irish and British prime ministers released their own version of the Hume-Adams
initiative known as the Downing Street Declaration. A summary of the key points of the
declaration follow:
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first attempt at Home Rule legislation. Despite its long history, it is unpopular with the British public and




• The British Government denies any "selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern
Ireland" and agrees that it is for the people of the entire island to decide if they wish to bring
about a united Ireland.
• The Irish Government accepts that a united Ireland will be politically unstable if it is rejected
by a significant minority of those it governs. Thus, the democratic right to self-determination
must be achieved and exercised with the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of
Northern Ireland.
• The Republic will work to create a new era of trust and mutual confidence so that "no
Northern Unionist should ever have to fear in future that.. .[the ideal of bringing together all
the people of Ireland]. ..will be pursued either by threat or coercion."
• In the event of an overall settlement the Irish Government will put forward and support
proposals for changes in the Irish Constitution which would fully reflect the principle of
consent in Northern Ireland.
• The achievement of peace must involve a permanent end to the use and support of
paramilitary violence. Democratically mandated parties committed to exclusively peaceful
methods are free to participate fully in dialogue with the Governments.
• The Irish Government will create a "Forum for Peace and Reconciliation" so that its
democratic parties may meet to recommend ways in which agreement and trust can be
promoted and established.
In response, Sinn Fein asked the British and Irish governments for "clarifications" on the
declaration. While some viewed the request for clarification as nothing more than an attempt to
draw the governments into public or secret talks, others interpreted it as a way to buy time, a
self-protective strategy to ensure that Sinn Fein did not go "so slowly as to become isolated by
public opinion in the wake of the huge welcome with the Downing Street Declaration received,
nor so fast as to cause divisions in the ranks."
But the Northern Ireland peace process now included a powerful international player
who was prepared to apply pressure where it could. Since Margaret Thatcher's "out, out, out"
rejection of the New Ireland Forum's proposals, constitutional nationalists had enlisted the
support of the United States in the peace process. President Ronald Reagan used his professional
relationship and personal camaraderie with Thatcher to register his concern for Anglo-Irish
dialogue. In January 1985 the Reagan administration acknowledged that while at Camp David
the previous month discussing the Star Wars defense initiative, Reagan had talked to Thatcher
about the need for further discussions for a peaceful resolution for Northern Ireland. In February
1985 Reagan went so far as to offer American financial support in the event of an agreed
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political initiative.
64 Now, almost a decade later, America tried again to add its leverage to the
peace process, this time by influencing the IRA. In February 1994, after being rejected ten times
before, Gerry Adams was granted a temporary visa to visit the United States. The British
government had vociferously argued against the visa but White House officials explained that is
was "a carrot to coax Mr. Adams to take further steps toward peace..."
Adams' two-day visit to America was a boon of positive publicity for Sinn Fein, but
after returning to Northern Ireland Gerry Adams produced no official acceptance or rejection of
the declaration. Worse, because the Irish and British governments had discordant views about
how to handle the declaration's rejection and whether or not to respond to Sinn Fein's request for
clarification, the agreement appeared to be more of a statement of positive principles than the
first step in a political settlement. On 9 March the IRA pounded London's Heathrow Airport
with a mortar attack, but the declaration was not abandoned by the politicians or the public. On
the contrary, on 9 July the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, Sir Hugh
Annesley, held out an incentive to the IRA: reduced patrols in Catholic neighborhoods if the
group called a cease-fire.
D. IRA CEASE-FIRE
During a special party conference on 24 July 1994, Sinn Fein members officially
rejected the Downing Street Declaration. Behind the scenes, though, the IRA leadership voted in
secret not to reject the Downing Street Declaration and to allow the peace process to go forward.
Publicly Sinn Fein had to move carefully for it feared a backlash from republicans if the IRA
appeared to be giving up the armed struggle. Some of their concern focused on republicans in
the United States, especially members of the Northern Ireland Aid Committee (NORAID) that
gave the IRA weapons and money. Gerry Adams and other Sinn Fein leaders decided that the
NORAID leadership would have to be briefed about the motives of a cease-fire before it was
officially announced so a special visa was arranged for Joe Cahill, the man who had helped
create NORAID, to visit America and explain to the group what was about to happen.
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Despite the rejection of the declaration Adams suggested that he still regarded it as a
welcome step towards a negotiated peace. On 31 August the unbelievable happened—the IRA
announced that
Recognising the potential of the current situation and in order to enhance the democratic
process and to underline our definitive commitment to its success, the leadership of the
IRA have decided that as of midnight Wednesday, August 31st, there will be a complete
cessation of military operations....
We note that the Downing Street Declaration is not a solution, nor was it presented as
such by its authors. A solution will only be found as a result of inclusive negotiations.
Others, not least the British government, have a duty to face up to their responsibilities,
It is our desire to significantly contribute with energy, determination and patience.
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While some people questioned IRA motives, most of the public greeted the
announcement with a combination ofjoy and skepticism. An official cease-fire had not been
called by the IRA since 1975. James Molyneaux, leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, demanded
that the IRA state the cease-fire was a "permanent" end to violence. British Prime Minister John
Major, who in December 1993 promised to meet with Sinn Fein after three months of peace, was
depending on unionist votes in the Commons and backed Molyneaux's semantic demand. On 13
October the Combined Loyalist Worker's Council announced a loyalist cease-fire, showing that
they, at least, accepted the unstated "permanency" of the IRA truce.
One consequence of the successful IRA cease-fire was that the peace movement had
"broadened out, incorporating not only the Republic of Ireland, but also the United States of
America." This was obvious when within a month of the announcement when Gerry Adams
was granted a visa to visit America for two weeks. While there in October 1994 he spoke on the
telephone with Vice President Al Gore, a conversation that gave him the same status as Unionists
in terms of direct contact with the White House. Adams returned to America in December and
was formally received at the White House by Tony Lake, President Clinton's national security
advisor. The mission of Adams' December visit was to get sanction from the U.S. government
to openly collect funds for Sinn Fein in America. By asking for this Sinn Fein indicated a
commitment to the normal democratic process of raising funds and movement away from the
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surreptitious gathering of money for arms—a move regarded as very positive in Dublin and
Washington.
By October Molyneaux and Major's stipulation for a "permanent" declaration had
quietly died down but was replaced with the more powerful issue of decommissioning IRA
weapons. The British Government now demanded that the IRA hand over its weapons before
negotiations could begin. Sinn Fein objected for a number of reasons: (1) the IRA could not
turn over its weapons since that was tantamount to surrender; (2) decommissioning had never
before been mentioned as a precondition for Sinn Fein entering the talks process; and (3) the
same demand had not been made of loyalist paramilitary groups. Importantly, senior soldiers,
policemen, and armed loyalists agreed that decommissioning weapons before political talks got
under way was a bad idea—it could lead to a break down of discipline within the IRA and
challenges to the republican leaders who had so far successfully sustained the cease-fire.
E. FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE AND DEMANDS FOR
DECOMMISSIONING
On 4 February 1995 the Times of London printed a story about an upcoming Anglo-Irish
"framework" for peace. Fearing that the blueprint impression the Times created would deter
unionists from reading and considering the proposals, Prime Minister John Major made a special
broadcast to the nation urging for "time" and "trust." The entire document was released on
22 February and contained the following key points for discussion:
• A new 90-member Northern Ireland Assembly to be elected by proportional representation.
The Assembly will have executive and legislative responsibilities over a range of subjects as
wide as in 1973.
• A system of Assembly Committees, constituted broadly in proportion to party strengths in the
Assembly.
• An all-Ireland body of elected representatives of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Irish
Parliament with executive, consultative and harmonising powers designated by the British
and Irish governments.
• The all-Ireland body will have an important role to play, in consultation with the two
Governments, in developing an agreed approach for the whole island in respect of the
challenges and opportunities of the European Union.
• The Irish government will introduce and support proposals to renounce its constitutional
claim to Northern Ireland.
• The British Government will propose changes to its constitutional legislation to acknowledge
the right of the people of Northern Ireland to choose their own destiny.
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• Increased co-operation between London and Dublin through a standing inter-governmental
conference.
• A charter of rights for everyone living in Northern Ireland and the Republic to guarantee the
protection of civil, political, and cultural freedoms.
• Issues of the Framework document should be comprehensively examined in dialogues
between the two governments and democratically mandated political parties from Northern
Ireland. The outcome of negotiations will be submitted for democratic ratification through
separate referendums in the North and South.
The Framework documents were built upon the three-strand process and the Downing
Street Declaration. Not surprisingly, Unionists unfavorably compared the package to the 1973
Sunningdale Agreement, but this time there was no talk of bringing down the government and no
7 1
encouragement from opposition parties to do so. Like Sunningdale, the document tried to
offer comfort to all sides and cast the British and Irish governments in the role of neutral
facilitator.
Despite these advances, there was little significant movement throughout 1995 because
of the decommissioning issue. The IRA considered the surrender of its arms a breach of the
Downing Street Declaration's commitment to admit Sinn Fein as a democratically elected party
to talks, "once they proved that they intended to abide by the democratic process." Again
America stepped in to nudge the peace process. In March 1995 President Bill Clinton granted
Gerry Adams' request for Sinn Fein to raise funds in America, hoping that in return Sinn Fein
would move forward on the decommissioning issue. In May an economic summit highlighting
American investment opportunities in Ireland was held in Washington that the Irish Times
reported "...represented the most significant engagement by the United States in the affairs of
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any European country since President Truman s Marshall Plan after the Second World War..."
But in July the White House was still putting pressure on Adams for Sinn Fein to deliver on the
issue of decommissioning.
Throughout the stalemate leaders of Sinn Fein met with British government ministers,
and eventually Gerry Adams met with the Northern Ireland secretary, Sir Patrick Mayhew.
These advances, though, were countered by sectarian violence during the summer marching
season. The only thing that saved the peace process from utter collapse was President Clinton's
impending visit to Britain and Ireland in December. Although the decommissioning issue was
not solved, an eleventh-hour "twin track" agreement was worked out between the British and
Irish governments in November whereby preliminary all-party talks would commence while an
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international commission, chaired by the former American senator George Mitchell, would
examine the weapons issue.
F. END OF CEASE-FIRE
Throughout December and January the international committee commissioned to
provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue held a series of meetings in
Belfast, Dublin, London, and New York. The committee listened to dozens of government
officials, political leaders, church officials, representatives of organizations and institutions, and
received hundreds of letters and telephone calls from members of the public. The report of the
international committee was released in January 1996. It began by stating that the committee
members "have no stake in Northern Ireland other than an interest in seeing an end to the conflict
and in the ability of its people to live in peace...We are motivated solely by our wish to help."
The report concluded that the decommissioning issue was a symptom of a larger
problem: the absence of trust. It proposed that to take the gun out of Irish politics demanded
that all parties commit and adhere to fundamental principles of democracy and non-violence
which they outlined as:
• Democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues.
• The total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations.
• Disarmament is verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission.
• Renouncement of any effort to use force or threaten to use force to influence the course or the
outcome of all-party negotiations.
• Agreement to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations and to
resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that
outcome with which they may disagree.
• Prevention and elimination of "punishment" killings and beatings.
The body recommended that the parties consider a compromise so that some
decommissioning takes place during the process of all-party negotiations, rather than all before
or all after. The parties could use this process to build confidence during negotiations and
suggest that the decommissioning process represent neither victory nor defeat.
Although the British government agreed to the principles of democracy and encouraged
everyone, especially the paramilitaries, to pledge their support, the government did not accept
the suggestion of talking before weapons were surrendered. Left where they were two months
Report of the International Body on Arms Decommissioning, http://www.nio.gov.uk,
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before and "inviting political assassination if they attempt to argue in favour of continuing with
the cease-fire," on 9 February 1996 the IRA detonated a 1000 pound bomb in London that
killed two people and ended the 17 month cease-fire. During the cease-fire 1500 British troops
had been withdrawn from the province, border roads closed since 1 969 were reopened, and, as
promised in July 1994, army patrols in northern towns ceased. When the cease-fire ended 900
troops were immediately returned to the province and all other signs of demilitarization were
reversed.
Attempts were made to carry on the peace process—a special election was held in May
and those elected would begin preliminary negotiations in June. Despite victories for Sinn Fein
in the elections, Gerry Adams was excluded from the talks. On 22 June the IRA set off a bomb
in Manchester. Another summer season of Protestant marches in Catholic neighborhoods
provoked hostility and intimidation across the province's villages and towns in an extreme not
seen since 1981 . On 12 October the IRA detonated two bombs at the British army headquarters
in Ulster. Both suspense and hope were gone—the 1993 attempt at peace was over.
Coogan, The Troubles, 405.
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V. COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS
A comparison of the 1973 and 1993 attempts shows how the political strategy for a
solution has adapted to new challenges, especially the changing face of political terrorism.
Analysis of the goals and the players will show what and why the issues for finding a settlement
shifted from simply setting up a government to basing the constitutional reconstruction upon the
consensus of all political participants, including the political wing of the IRA. Since the next
attempt at peace will build upon this last one, a careful reading of its history and a comparison
with similar conflicts can focus the search for a settlement on fixing what failed through new,
imaginative methods.
A. THE GOALS
The goals of both attempts were to establish a lasting political settlement, implement
economic recovery, and end sectarian violence. In both cases that basic issues were the same
—
security and devolution. Proposals for peace were essentially the same—a power-sharing
executive, an assembly elected through proportional representation, and an all-Ireland Council.
However, between the two attempts the number and type of key players changed. In addition to
the unionist, nationalist, labor and conservative parties, the peace process by 1993 also included
the United States and, more importantly, "terrorists" who entered the political fray as
representatives of legal political wings such as Sinn Fein.
The 1973 attempt tried to produce a devolved governmental structure while the 1993
attempt tried to talk about one. The high point of the 1973 attempt was the successful
implementation of the Northern Ireland executive; the low point was the unionist general strike
in opposition to the Sunningdale Agreement. The 1993 attempt started out a step behind where
the 1973 attempt ended. Instead of immediately producing a new executive and Council of
Ireland, it began with a joint statement between the British and Irish governments that described
their mutual desire for a lasting political settlement reached through discussions between
constitutional parties. With the publication of the Joint Framework in 1995, the 1993 attempt
approached the beginning 1973 point by suggesting a new assembly, a power-sharing executive,
and an all-Ireland Council.
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The achievements and failings of the two attempts were due in no small part to the times
in which they evolved. The Sunningdale Agreement and power-sharing executive were
tremendous achievements. Amidst Catholic fears that the discriminatory Stormont system would
be reimposed, and Protestant fears that their security and way of life was disintegrating, the
Northern Ireland executive brought together two divergent political communities that were
sworn enemies. Despite this achievement, it failed because the devastating general strike was
more than unionist displeasure with the concept of sharing power with nationalists, it was a
coordinated embodiment of their fear of the Republic's encroachment upon Ulster's unionhood
with Britain.
By 1993 unionist and nationalist fears were no less apparent, yet they had been tempered
by the intervening years. Stormont had not been reimposed, but neither had the union been
negated. In addition, terrorist violence had become no less terrible, but it had become somewhat
commonplace, reaching, for some, an "acceptable level of violence." Furthermore, the 1985
Anglo-Irish Agreement had politically isolated republican and unionist extremists and formally
invited the Republic to participate in the management of the crisis. By the time the Downing
Street Declaration was announced unionists and nationalists were willing to come in from
political exile. Although Sinn Fein never made it to "all-party" talks, the invitation set a
precedent that will hopefully make the organization less disagreeable to the other players when
the offer is made again. It is a bittersweet victory for anti-terrorists—Sinn Fein does not
renounce the IRA but its leaders demonstrate the ability to understand the necessity of
democratic political dialogue and the uselessness of political isolation, and how to maintain an
extended cease-fire.
B. THE PLAYERS
After partition in the 1920s Westminster preferred to let Stormont alone, happy that at
last Ireland seemed to be taking care of itself. Fifty years later the Irish Question again raised its
head, forcing the British government to reconsider the constitutional arrangement that had kept
that complicated land from interfering in British politics. After Britain decided that Stormont's
law and order reforms and security policies were endangering the lives of British soldiers, direct
rule was imposed. Since then, Britain has tried on the roles of Protestant defender and Catholic
ombudsman, finding neither a comfortable fit. Instead, since the Sunningdale Agreement, the
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British government has tried to take the middle ground, promoting itself as a neutral facilitator,
going so far as declaring in 1993 that it has no "selfish or strategic interest" in the troubled
province.
British policy is an intricate jumble of colonial obligation and self-preservation. Every
step it takes—whether involving itself with the army, or extricating itself by inviting the
Republic to help—seems to only draw it deeper into a quagmire. For all the trouble Northern
Ireland causes Britain (perhaps because of all the trouble?), the province has never been a
number one priority for the government, often times progress being compromised for domestic
politics (Whitelaw's transfer to London on the eve of Sunningdale; courting unionists in general
elections). However hopeless the situation may seem, though, the 1993 attempt indicates that
there has been some maturity in the government's policies over the last twenty years. A
comparison of the Sunningdale communique and the Downing Street Declaration show that the
basic interpretation of the problem as an inter-communal struggle has not changed, nor has
British commitment to that majority in Ulster, nor has the proposed solutions, but the path to a
settlement is taking a more sophisticated route.
Over the years a pattern of isolating extremists has become one of Britain's most
successful security strategies. Improved intelligence gathering monitors and imprisons
suspected terrorists, and redefining political prisoners and as common criminals tries to isolate
the terrorist campaign from physical force mythology. Political isolation has also become a
powerful tool for the British, although it is a double-edged sword—during the 1994-95 IRA
cease-fire Britain failed to follow through on her promise of including Sinn Fein in all-party
talks. The British government ended up paying a heavy price for her subterfuge: in the days
following the February 1996 bombing a poll in the Republic reported that 61% held the British
government responsible for the breakdown of the cease-fire compared to only 23% who blamed
the IRA and Sinn Fein. Eighty-four percent of those polled said the British and Irish
"7ft
governments should meet Sinn Fein leaders even though the IRA had ended its cease-fire.
An important change for the British government is its acceptance of outside intervention
in the peace process. Not only has it asked for the Republic's help, but since the 1980s has
accepted, although unhappily at times, the involvement of the United States. Furthermore, both
Britain and Ireland are anxious to protect their position in the European Union—both morally
and financially. This is apparent in that the Sunningdale communique, the Downing Street
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Declaration, and the Framework for Peace documents make explicit references to finding a
solution that will work within the European community.
Although the Republic of Ireland participated in the 1973 attempt through designing the
Council of Ireland, they were not fully accepted by the British in the management of the crisis
until 1985. Any flirtations with integrating Northern Ireland into the British state that may have
arisen during the 1972-1974 crisis have been left behind and Britain now leans toward
encouraging the eventual unification of the north and south. Over the years, however, the
Republic has moderated its unification rhetoric. Since the 1970s, when the Republic entered the
European Community and began to make itself an economic competitor in the world community,
it has become less enthusiastic about the huge financial and social tasks that would come with
the wholesale absorption of Ulster. Yet the Republic is anxious to be involved in the peace
process, not only because the citizens feel a heritage with the north, but because the government
knows that their own stability relies upon peace in the entire island.
The Anglo-Irish Agreement significantly enhanced the Republic's participation in the
peace process by giving it power to affect police, prison, and security policies—traditionally the
most sensitive issues in the conflict. In return, by 1995 the Republic was willing to change its
constitution in an effort to make unification less coercive and more palatable to Protestants.
Since the Downing Street Declaration the Republic publicly accepts the constitutional status of
the north as a part of the United Kingdom and repeatedly acknowledges that unification is
impossible without the consent of the majority in Ulster.
Ulster Unionist leaders have become more extreme and less cooperative since their
power-sharing days in the 1970s. They were isolated throughout the late 1980s after the Anglo-
Irish Agreement but this probably helped moderate them since they learned the hard way that
political isolation is anathema to influence. Throughout the early 1990s Ulster Unionists tried to
hold hostage British Conservative plans for the peace process: "Clearly John Major's Irish
policy has been affected by his having parliamentary majority of only nine seats when between
them the Unionists control thirteen seats. Seen in this light, the 'decommissioning' issue is the
contemporary equivalent of the 'Orange card', and we have seen where that led."
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unionist leaders during the 1973 attempt had the foresight to understand the importance of
reform and cooperation with constitutional nationalists, since then the leadership has become
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truculent and sanctimonious. This, too, could be attributed to the passage of time. In the face of
a political vacuum in 1973 unionists may have been willing to work with nationalists to assure
themselves a place in any new political structure. But twenty years have passed in which their
trust in the British government has not been restored, but in which they have managed to take
advantage of their own kind of influence at Westminster.
The majority of constitutional nationalists are still represented by the SDLP which has
matured into a very politically astute organization. The SDLP's relationship has always been
closer with the Republic than with London, and since the 1980s its leader, John Hume, has
fostered a close relationship with influential politicians in America. The SDLP was hurt by the
popularity of Sinn Fein after the 1981 hunger strikes, but managed to recover thanks to their
leaders' determination for the creation of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. In spite of competition
with Sinn Fein, the SDLP is savvy and courageous enough to talk with Gerry Adams,
appreciating more than any other party the importance of Sinn Fein's involvement in the
legitimate political system. The SDLP realizes the strength of unionist fears and traditions and
has accepted that lasting change does not come easily or quickly in Northern Ireland, but it is
well-positioned with public and international support and shows all signs of being around when a
solution is finally found.
C. NEGOTIATING WITH TERRORISTS
By far the most important change in the two attempts at peace is the entrance of Sinn
Fein as a participant in the process. Although Sinn Fein never entered the all-party talks, is
surpassed by the SDLP in electoral strength, and is regarded by some as no more than an
insincere mouth-piece for terrorists, its inclusion in democratic dialogue and its maintenance of
the cease-fire were the driving forces of the 1993 attempt. Since it appears that a cease-fire
followed by all-party talks will continue to be the plan for progress with Tony Blair's new
Labour government in Westminster, we should examine why Sinn Fein never made it to the
negotiating table. It will be helpful to consider two theories that the British, unionist, and Irish
politicians and public are debating—simply, whether or not to negotiate with terrorists.
Two scholars, Robert Clark and Christopher Hewitt, present opposing theories about the
efficacy and morality of negotiating with terrorists. Both deal with the same arguments: (1)
negotiations give insurgents respectability or legitimacy; (2) insurgent demands are usually
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expressed in non-negotiable rhetoric and so extreme that negotiations can never have a positive
or productive outcome; and (3) cease-fires that may result from successful negotiations are only
temporary and benefit the insurgents by improving their public image and giving them time to
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regroup and gather strength for the next round of violence.
Clark chronicles negotiations between the Basque separatist organization, ETA, and the
Spanish government in his book, Negotiating with ETA: Obstacles to Peace in the Basque
Country, 1975-1988. He points out that not since World War II has a single case of an armed
insurgency in Europe ended through negotiations. Despite this, Clark argues that there are some
very good reasons why a settlement negotiated with terrorists is a good idea. First, even if the
cease-fire is temporary, it is an opportunity to reduce the level of violent emotions and can help
build mutual trust and confidence between the parties. Furthermore, successful negotiations
strengthen the moderates on both sides of the conflict. Pragmatically, Clark points out that if the
government cannot suppress the insurgents or win over the bystanders, negotiations may be the
only realistic way out of the violence: "In other words, negotiations may be the best solution to
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insurgency, not because it is such a good option, but simply because all the others are so bad."
Hewitt, on the other hand, argues that negotiating a cease-fire not only damages the
legitimacy of the government, but it does not have any long-term benefits to concluding a
conflict. In his study, The Effectiveness ofAnti-Terrorist Policies, Hewitt acknowledges that
politicians in democratic societies are tempted to negotiate a settlement with terrorists for three
reasons: (1) the cultural ethos of western societies emphasize the give and take of negotiations
rather than the use of force to resolve conflicts; (2) terrorists leaders are the only ones who can
stop terrorism with a simple command; and (3) negotiations are intrinsically desirable because
oi
they are usually accompanied by a truce.
But, according to Hewitt, truces are often defined in a very restricted way that disguises
their utility to the general public. For example, he points out that the IRA truce in February 1975
was between the terrorists and the British Army. The Provisionals continued to attack loyalists
and members of other groups. Hewitt argues that this makes it "difficult to justify a 'truce'
which merely results in a redirection of terrorist attacks." Before responding to a cease-fire
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offer Hewitt recommends that the government consider the extent to which terrorist leadership
can control its followers and the reaction of other terrorist groups. In some cases one terrorist
group increases its activity while the other is dormant, and the longer a truce holds, the more
likely is a splintering of the militants from the group.
Hewitt supports the theory that terrorist demands are too radical and non-negotiable to
lead to conflict resolution, especially in cases such as the IRA when the group is demanding a
change in national sovereignty. Cease-fires invariably break down, leaving the government to
deal with a terrorist army that used the truce to rebuild its military strength. Hewitt's final
analysis concludes that negotiating a truce with terrorists is a short-sighted policy that will not
lead to resolution of the conflict and that protracted cease-fires benefit of the terrorists rather
than the government.
Although Hewitt may be correct in his analysis of the February 1975 IRA truce—that it
was a limited truce that did not prevent the IRA from continuing its violence against civilians
and loyalist paramilitaries, and that the IRA emerged militarily stronger after the truce—there is
no evidence that these arguments can be applied to the 1994 IRA cease-fire. On the contrary,
with very few exceptions, all hostilities between the IRA, the police, the army, and loyalist
paramilitary groups ceased for the 17-month period. Violence that did occur was likely caused
by both republican and loyalist splinter groups and individuals unhappy with the decision to lay
down the gun.
There is evidence that Robert Clark's arguments for negotiating a settlement have more
beneficial outcomes. According to an article in the Independent shortly after the IRA broke its
cease-fire "Peace has shifted public opinion, softened old enmities, broken down divisions
between communities. The desire to press on with these changes has been demonstrated over the
past 10 days with peace rallies in Northern Ireland calling for peace." Furthermore, the end of
the cease-fire did not decrease public and political support for a solution through the talks
process; rather, it appeared to increase support for it:
The IRA cease-fire of August 1994 was widely seen as vindication and justification of
the policy of holding dialogue with elements such as Sinn Fein. In its wake many
Unionists said privately that talks with Sinn Fein were inevitable, but Unionist political
leaders favoured delay. ...That collapse [of the cease-fire] seems if anything to have
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resistance to talks, elements in the Protestant community as disparate as senior
businessmen, police officers and loyalist paramilitaries say there must be discussion.
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If more dialogue is indeed the way the process will proceed, it is best to consider how it
can get past the current impasse.
D. THIRD PARTY MEDIATION
Acceptance of the United States and international committees in the peace process is a
significant change in the British attitude and bodes well since conflict resolution theory
encourages the use of third parties as mediators. Thomas Princen studies third party mediation
in his book Intermediaries in International Conflict. As if written especially for Northern
Ireland, Princen points out that "nationalist demands for autonomy and self-determination rooted
in ethnic sentiments or economic deprivation make military intervention costly and often
counterproductive. But if military intervention is increasingly unattractive, other forms of
intervention, forms that rely less on force and more on persuasion and bargaining, become
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increasingly attractive." The use of intermediaries to influence the facilitation of a settlement
is an attractive and effective form of intervention.
The role of intermediary is not to change the balance of power or impose solutions, but
to gain the parties' acceptance and intervene in the affairs of states to effect change.
Intermediaries may be large or small, state and non-state, and their subtle processes may involve
the use or threat of force and offers of aid (or threats to withhold aid). Their impact comes not
from their position as a great power, but upon their position of being in the middle.
Intermediaries are valuable because official negotiations are conducted by heads of states and
politicians as much as by professional diplomats. This means that the negotiations are subjected
to the pressures of public opinion and domestic politics. Politicians' first priority is to gain favor
David McKittrick, "Momentum for Talks Builds as Major Joins 'Right' Side," Independent, 1 March
1996,2.
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at home, not reach mutually accommodative agreements and the mass media play a role in the
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grandstanding and tough talk that often dominates these negotiations.
Third parties are sought as legitimating agent. It is their role to persuade the other side
of their rightful position, and persuade one's constituency of the necessity of concession when
compromise is necessary. They are expected to be trustworthy, neutral and impartial. As a
result, intermediaries, in the process of facilitating communication, may inadvertently allow the
disputing parties to gain a greater understanding of the other side's need and fears and their
willingness to change or accommodate.
Clearly mediators have been used throughout the troubles, ranging from religious groups
(clergymen who worked for the Feakle peace initiative) to superpowers (the United States), to
international bodies (the Mitchell Commission that investigated de-commissioning issues). In
the wake of the peace accords for the Middle East and Bosnia, brokered in part by the United
States, attention turned naturally to Northern Ireland as people optimistically compared the
intractable conflicts. Undoubtedly third party intervention broke new ground and contributed to
the peace agreements, but attempts at mediation in Northern Ireland have yet to prove successful
in concluding a formal political settlement. However, Senator Mitchell's decommissioning
committee is a positive indication that mediators may be used more in the future and could be an
effective option for enhancing future negotiations.
E. LEARNING FROM OTHERS
In Robert Clark's book about ETA and the Spanish government he identifies three types
of obstacles to negotiations. The ETA case bears striking resemblance to Northern Ireland, and
as future attempts at peace in both countries will involve the negotiating process, it is worthwhile
to consider how Clark analyzes the Basque situation. An objective comparison of the two could
reveal useful patterns of behavior on the part of the terrorists and the governments, as well as
inspire options for future peace attempts.
The first obstacle Clark identifies as "contextual." He asks that all parties recognize that
they are operating in an extremely complex institutional environment with many contending
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"The result is that public pronouncements are directed more to constituencies back home than to
negotiators across the table; they neither speak to each other nor do they genuinely listen. In short,




political forces and groups whose agendas and priorities are constantly shifting. It is difficult for
paramilitary leaders whose priorities may be a negotiated settlement to move at the right pace
—
to deal with disruptive anti-truce elements without appearing too conciliatory toward their
enemies. He suggests that those willing to arrange a cease-fire keep the initial agenda general
and limited to administrative and technical questions until talks firmly begin. Once talks are
underway no item should be rejected out of hand. Pro-truce elements should defuse their
opposition by refusing to say certain acts will destroy the talks—for example, by stating that an
armed attack will suspend talks, anti-truce forces have the power to torpedo negotiations by
committing that act. ' Clark believes that skilled intermediaries are crucial to the successful
conduct of negotiations to build trust and confidence between the parties. Furthermore, the press
must behave responsibly and exercise self-control in their coverage of negotiations. The media
should recognize the benefits of keeping negotiations out of the public eye, at least at the
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beginning.
The second type of obstacle Clark identifies as "violence." He points out that talks with
ETA have broken down because of a disagreement over whether the cease-fire should come
before, during, or after the resolution of the issues. Like the British, the Spanish government
says that it will not negotiate while the killing is going on. The problem is that both sides want
to negotiate from a position of strength, not weakness. Clark points out that "it would. ..be
helpful to remember that the very nature of armed struggle makes it impossible to renounce the
use of force before securing one's aims. As numerous ETA strategists have pointed out, the only
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thing they have to offer at the bargaining table is their ability to turn off the violence."
Clark described the third obstacle as "political v. technical". Technical issues are open
for discussion with ETA but political ones cannot be placed on the agenda. A "two-track"
approach is one way to differentiate between the sets of issues. It was developed because the
Spanish government considers political negotiations with ETA unthinkable, but will negotiate
with a political party closely tied to the separatists. Track one deals with amnesty arrangements
for convicted insurgents, public order, law enforcement, security, the administration ofjustice,
and measures to ensure the complete cessation of ETA-related acts of violence. One sensitive








police decommissioning and it seems highly unlikely that ETA would ever agree to disarm, at
least during the early stages of negotiations.
Track two political issues challenge the legitimacy of existing constitutional
arrangements, so they must be discussed among the widest possible array of political parties and
interested groups. Because the presence ofETA would call into question the legitimacy of the
state, the insurgents are represented by intermediaries who are trusted by the rebels and regarded
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as legitimate participants in civil society. The potential for success lies in the separation of the
negotiations into two venues, two agendas, and two negotiating bodies, thus allowing parties in
conflict to negotiate with one another without actually appearing to do so.
In one way or another the 1993 attempt at peace in Northern Ireland dealt with all of
these issues. Although neither the Northern Ireland nor the Basque dilemma has been resolved,
with so much in common studying the each other's achievements and failings can hopefully
teach the other one important lessons. In making a comparative study of political violence it is
paradoxical to say that each conflict is essentially the same, because what could be more unique
and more personal than the battle between the terrorist and the state? Yet important trends in
behavior, expectations, and reactions can be discovered by reviewing histories and attempts at
peace and categorizing them by their successes and failures, their motivations and their
consequences. It is easy to understand why Northern Ireland provides so much fodder for
romance about freedom-fighters and independence because the conflict contains all of the
fundamental elements for exciting fiction. But it is the duty of scholars, politicians, and
statesmen to put the fiction on the shelf and to take up in its place the tally of over 3000 people
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The circle remains to be squared, but a comparison of the 1973 and the 1993 attempts at
peace shows that the challenge has not lain dormant these past twenty years. However, it does
reveal that in many ways in Northern Ireland, "the more things change, the more things stay the
same."
The latest phase of the troubles started in 1969 with the Catholic civil rights movement,
but by 1973 there was an obvious shift in the circumstances. Protests between groups of civil
rights demonstrators were replaced by the less organized but bloodier inter-communal violence
of republican and loyalist paramilitaries. The abolishment of Stormont left a political vacuum
and the crisis of a threatened union. Because the 1973 attempt at peace failed to restore some
form of self-government and order to Northern Ireland, the province reverted to direct rule from
Westminster.
By 1993 there had been another obvious shift in the circumstances in Northern Ireland.
Where the Republic of Ireland had been guardedly included in the creation of a political
settlement in 1973, it was now formally invited and encouraged to partake in the management of
the crisis. The junior SDLP party, only three years old during the power-sharing experiment,
was now the senior constitutional nationalist party and an adroit player, working hard to
encourage the participation of Sinn Fein and the United States in the peace process. Most
importantly, Sinn Fein, the legal and political wing of the Irish Republican Army, had an
electoral base that qualified it as a constitutional participant in the process.
Yet the same historical issues continue to haunt Northern Ireland and every attempt at
peace. The fears of the "double minority" have not changed much over the last 300 years, nor
have the historical issues upon which these fears are based: discrimination, partition, and
violence. Since 1973 the structure of a proposed political arrangement has remained very
stable—a power-sharing executive, an assembly elected by proportional representation, an
extensive committee structure within the assembly to administer devolved responsibilities, and
the renunciation of violence. What has changed are the players, their roles, and their attitudes.
In addition to adding Sinn Fein, third parties such as the United States and independent
international committees have entered the ring in an attempt to mediate the conflict. During the
late 1980s Britain successfully isolated extremists in the unionist and republican parties so that
by the 1993 attempt they had moderated themselves enough to support the plan for multi-party
talks (if they could make it to the table).
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There are competing opinions on whether the future ofNorthern Ireland depends upon
the decisions of British politicians, or upon the two sides in Ulster resolving their
differences.
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The reality is that a final resolution depends upon a combination of the two.
While Britain, Ireland, and the constitutional parties can create a political settlement, it will not
last until the unionists and the nationalists accept the plan. Paul Wilkinson in his book Terrorism
and the Liberal State, argues that "the real secret of the inner political resilience and adaptability
of liberal democracies, so often overlooked, is their capacity to tolerate, respond to, and harness
the forces of popular protest and discontent." Progress has been made in Northern Ireland, the
most thrilling demonstration being the IRA and loyalist cease-fires. The loyalist cease-fire
remains in operation and the abandonment by the IRA of theirs does not preclude another one in
the future.
No attempt at peace in Northern Ireland really ends. As this comparison shows, the 1993
attempt was built upon the solutions proposed in 1973. Every attempt builds upon the previous
one and the most effective attempt will depend upon players who can recognize shifts in the
priorities and abilities of the other players to control their followers and deliver their promises.
By expanding the search for peace to third party intermediaries, cultivating inter-communal
cooperation through educational and police reforms, and paying attention to the attempts being
tried in similar situations such as the Basque region, the circle may finally be squared. What is
impossible geometrically is not impossible psychologically.
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"...whatever the importance of Irish and American involvement in what has become known as the Peace
Process, it is still the case that, as so often in the past, the fate of Ireland hangs ultimately on the decisions
of British politicians." Boyce, 161.
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APPENDIX A: POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARAMILITARY
ORGANIZATIONS
POLITICAL PARTIES
Alliance Party Non-sectarian, moderate unionist party that draws between 8 and 10% of the vote in
Northern Ireland.
Combined Loyalist Military Command (CLMC) Emerged in 1991 as a shadowy umbrella organization
for principal loyalist paramilitary groups, including the UDA/UFF, UVF, and Red Hand Commando.
Announced the 1994 loyalist cease-fire through PUP and UDP representatives.
Conservative One of the main political parties of Britain. Associated with right-of-center politics and
historically allied with Unionist parties in Northern Ireland.
Dail Eireann The parliament of the Republic of Ireland known simply as "the Dail."
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) Most militantly Protestant and loyalist of the two mainstream unionist
parties. Founded and led by the Rev. Ian Paisley since 1971. Draws between 13 and 18% of the Northern
Ireland vote.
Fianna Fail Largest and most powerful of the Irish political parties. Founded in 1926 by Eamon de
Valera after a split with Sinn Fein. Name in Gaelic means "Warriors of Destiny."
Fine Gail Second largest political party in Republic. Formed in 1933.
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) An IRA splinter group consisting mostly of ex-Provisionals and
ex-Officials. Active mostly in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Only important group not to declare a
cease-fire in 1994.
Irish Republican Brotherhood A revolutionary independence movement established in 1858.
Reorganized after failed 1916 Easter Rising to become the leadership cadre of the IRA.
Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP) Legal political wing of the Irish National Liberation Army
(INLA). Working-class, rigidly socialist, negligible electoral support, critical of the 1994 IRA cease-fire.
Labour The other main political party of Britain. Associated with labour unions and left-of-center
politics. Also the name of the third largest political party in the Irish Republic.
Official Irish Republican Army Made up mostly of members who declined to join the Provos (the
Provisional IRA) in 1970. Maintains the IRA goal of a socialist 32-county Ireland. Declared a cease-fire in
1972 and has been largely dormant since. Political wing known as the Workers Party has negligible
electoral support.
Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) One of the two "loyalist fringe parties," considered to represent the
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) loyalist paramilitary. Working-class, pragmatically socialist. It has
negligible overall electoral support but is influential on account of some high-profile constituents.
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) Major force of the IRA and principal republican
paramilitary organization. Formed in 1970 by militants who split from the Official IRA. Advocates the
use of force to create a 32-county socialist state.
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Provisional Sinn Fein Founded in 1905, Sinn Fein has gone through a number of transformations to
become the legal and political party of the Provisional IRA. In Gaelic the name means "ourselves alone."
Draws between 10 and 12% of the Northern Ireland vote; less than 2% of the Republic's vote. Gerry
Adams has been party president since 1983.
Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) Largest nationalist party in Northern Ireland, it draws about
22% of the vote. Created in 1970 from the remnants of a weakened Nationalist Party, the SDLP promotes
the necessity of majority consent for a united Ireland and the nonviolent political concept of "constitutional
nationalism." Primarily Catholic. John Hume has been its leader since 1979.
Stormont Two meanings:
1) Stormont Castle, the building on the outskirts of Belfast from which the province has been administered
since 1932.
2) Reference to the Protestant and Unionist controlled parliament that ruled Northern Ireland from 1921 to
1972.
Ulster Defense Association (UDA)/Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) The major Protestant paramilitary
group formed in 1970 from local vigilante groups. Outlawed in 1992 but alleged to have links with the
DUP and the UDR. The UFF has claimed responsibility for several sectarian murders.
Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) A security force formed in 1970 to replace the old, infamously
prejudicial B-Special Corps. Heavily criticized and placed under British Army control in 1992.
Ulster Unionist Party (Official Unionists) Largest political party in Northern Ireland. Draws between 30
and 34% of the vote. One of the two mainstream unionist parties—compared to the DUP it has a more
moderate view of unionism.
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) Second largest loyalist paramilitary organization after the UDA/UFF.
Founded in 1965 it takes its name from the illegal army raised in 1912 to fight Irish Home Rule. Like the
IRA, the UVF is a clandestine operation. Has close ties to the Red Hand Commando, a small ruthless
loyalist paramilitary group.
Westminster Another name for the Parliament of the United Kingdom that meets at Westminster Hall.
Also referred to as Whitehall.
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APPENDIX B: DEATHS IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1969-1996
RUC UDR/
Year RUC Reserve Army RJR a Civilians TOTAL
1969 1 12 13
1970 2 23 25
1971 11 43 5 115 174
1972 14 3 103 26 321 467
1973 10 3 58 8 171 250
1974 12 3 28 7 166 216
1975 7 4 14 6 216 247
1976 13 10 14 15 245 297
1977 8 6 15 14 69 112
1978 4 6 14 7 50 81
1979 9 5 38 10 51 113
1980 3 6 8 9 50 76
1981 13 8 10 13 57 101
1982 8 4 21 7 57 97
1983 9 9 5 10 44 77
1984 7 2 9 10 36 64
1985 14 9 2 4 25 54
1986 10 2 4 8 37 61
1987 9 7 3 8 66 93
1988 4 2 21 12 54 93
1989 7 2 12 2 39 62
1990 7 5 7 8 49 76
1991 5 1 5 8 75 94
1992 2 1 4 2 76 85
1993 3 3 6 2 70 84
1994 3 1 2 55 61
1995 1 8 9
1996° 13 13
TOTALS 196 101 449 203 2260 3209
a On 1 July 1992 the Royal Irish Rangers and the Ulster Defence Regiment were amalgamated to form the
Royal Irish Regiment. The 1992 figure relates to Royal Irish Regiment (Home Service) personnel only.
Includes suspected terrorists
c Up to 30 November 1996
Data provided by the Northern Ireland Office web site at http://www.nio.gov.Uk/secintro.htm#army
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The conference between the British and Irish Governments and the parties involved in the Northern
Ireland executive (designate) met at Sunningdale on December 6, 7, 8, and 9, 1973.
2. During the conference each delegation stated their position on the status of Northern Ireland.
3. The Taoiseach [Prime minister of the Republic of Ireland] said that the basic principle of the conference
was that the participants had tried to see what measure of agreement of benefit to all people concerned
could be secured. In doing so all had reached accommodation with one another on practical arrangements.
But none had compromised and none had asked others to compromise in relation to basic aspirations. The
people of the republic, together with a minority in Northern Ireland, as represented by the SDLP
delegation, continued to uphold the aspirations towards a united Ireland. The only unity they wanted to see
was the unity established by consent.
4. Mr Brian Faulkner said that delegates from Northern Ireland came to the conference as representatives
of apparently incompatible sets of political aspirations who had found it possible to reach agreement to join
together in government because each accepted that in doing so they were not sacrificing principles or
aspirations. The desire of the majority of the people in Northern Ireland to remain part of the United
Kingdom, as represented by the Unionist and Alliance delegations, remained firm.
5. The Irish Government fully accepted and solemnly declared that there could be no change in the status
of Northern Ireland until a majority of the people of Northern Ireland desired a change in that status.
The British Government solemnly declared that it was, and would remain, their policy to support the
wishes of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland. The present status of Northern Ireland is that it is
part of the United Kingdom. If in future the majority of the people of Northern Ireland should indicate a
wish to become part of the united Ireland, the British Government would support that wish.
6. The conference agreed that a formal agreement incorporating the declarations of the British and Irish
Governments would be signed at the formal stage of the conference and registered at the United Nations.
7. The conference agreed that a Council of Ireland would be set up. It would be confined to
representatives of the two parts of Ireland with appropriate safeguards for the British Government's
financial and other interests. It would comprise a council of ministers with executive and harmonising
functions and a consultative assembly with advisory and review functions. The council of ministers would
act by unanimity and would comprise a corps of seven members of the Irish Government and an equal
number of members of the Northern Ireland Executive with provision for the participation of other non
voting members of the Irish Government and the Northern Ireland Executive for administration when
matters within their departmental competence were discussed. The council of ministers would control the
functions of the council, the chairmanship would rotate on an agreed basis between representatives of the
Irish Government and of the Northern Ireland Executive. Arrangements would be made for the location of
the first meeting and the location of subsequent meetings would be determined by the council of ministers.
The consultative assembly would consist of 60 members, 30 members from the Dail Eireann chosen by the
Dail on the basis of proportional representation by the single transferable vote and 30 members from the
Northern Ireland Assembly chosen by that assembly and also on that basis. The members of the
consultative assembly would be paid allowances. There would be a secretariat to the council which would
be kept as small as might be commensurate with efficiency in the operation of the council.
The secretariat would service the institutions of the council, and would under the council of ministers,
supervise the carrying out of the executive and harmonising functions and the consultative role of the
council. The secretariat would be headed by a secretary general. Following the appointment of a Northern
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Ireland Executive, the Irish Government and the Northern Ireland Executive would nominate their
representatives to a council of ministers. The council of ministers would then appoint a secretary general
and decide upon the location of its permanent headquarters. The secretary general would be directed to
procede with the drawing up of plans for such headquarters. The council of ministers would also make
arrangements for the recruitment of the staff of the secretariat in a manner and on conditions which would,
as far as is practicable, be consistent with those applying to public servants in the two administrations.
8. In the context of its harmonizing functions and consultative role the Council of Ireland would undertake
important work relating, for instance, to the impact of EEC membership. As for the executive functions,
the first step would be to decide and agree these in detail. The conference therefore decided that, in view
of the administrative complexities involved, studies would at once be set in hand to identify and, prior to
the formal stage of the conference, report on areas of common interest in relation to which a Council of
Ireland would take executive decisions and in appropriate cases be responsible for carrying those decisions
into effect. In carrying out these studies and also in determining what should be done by the council in
terms of harmonizing, the objectives to be borne in mind would include the following:
(1) To achieve the best utilization of scarce skills, expertise and resources;
(2) To avoid in the interest of economy and efficiency unnecessary duplication of effort; and
(3) To ensure complementary rather than competitive effort where this is to the advantage of agriculture,
commerce and industry.
In particular these studies would be directed to identifying, for the purposes of executive action by the
Council of Ireland, suitable aspects of activities in the following broad fields: (a) exploitation,
conservation and development of natural resources in the environment; (b) agricultural matters (including
agricultural research), animal health, and operational aspects of the common agricultural policy, forestry
and fisheries; (c) cooperative ventures in the field of trade and industry; (d) electricity generation; (e)
tourism; (f) roads and transport; (g) advisory services in the field of public health; (h) sport, culture and the
arts. It would be for the Oireachtas and the Northern Ireland Assembly to legislate from time to time as to
the extent of functions to be developed to the Council of Ireland. Where necessary, the British
Government will cooperate in this devolution of functions. Initially, the functions to be vested would be
those identified in accordance with the procedures set out above and decided at the formal stage of the
conference to be transferred.
9. (i) During the initial period following the establishment of the council, the revenue of the council would
be provided by means of grants from the two administrations in Ireland toward agreed projects and
budgets, according to the nature of the service involved.
(ii) It was also agreed that further studies would be put in hand forthwith and completed as soon as possible
of methods of financing the council after the initial period which would be consonant with the
responsibilities and functions assigned to it.
(iii) It was agreed that the secretariat of the Council of Ireland would be shared equally and other services
would be financed broadly in proportion to where expenditure or benefit accrues.
(iv) The amount of money required to finance the council's activities will depend upon the function
assigned to it from time to time.
(v) While Britain continues to pay subsidies to Northern Ireland, such payments would not involve Britain
participating in the council. Its being accepted, nevertheless, that it would be legitimate for Britain to
safeguard in an appropriate way financial involvement in Northern Ireland.
10. It was agreed by all parties that persons committing crimes of violence, however motivated, in any part
of Ireland, should be brought to trial irrespective of the part of Ireland in which they are located. The
concern which large sections of the people of Northern Ireland felt about this problem was in particular
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forcefully expressed by the representatives of the Unionist and Alliance parties. The representatives of the
Irish Government stated that they fully understood and fully shared this concern. Different ways of solving
this problem were discussed; among them were the amendment of legislation operating in the two
jurisdictions on extradition, the creation of a common law enforcement area in which an all Ireland court
would. ..jurisdiction, and the. ..of the jurisdiction of domestic courts so as to enable them to try offences
committed outside the jurisdiction. It was agreed that problems of considerable legal complexity were
involved and that the British and Irish Governments would jointly set up a commission to consider all the
proposals put forward at the conference and to recommend as a matter of extreme urgency the most
effective means of dealing with those who commit these crimes. The Irish Government undertook to take
immediate and effective legal steps so that persons coming within their jurisdiction and accused of murder
however motivated, committed in Northern Ireland, will be brought to trial and it was agreed that any
similar reciprocal action that may be needed in Northern Ireland be taken by the appropriate authorities.
1 1
.
It was agreed that the council would be invited to consider in what way the principles of the European
convention on human rights and fundamental freedoms would be expressed in domestic legislation in each
part of Ireland. It would recommend whether further legislation or the creation of other institutions,
administrative or judicial, is required in either part of embracing the whole of Ireland to provide additional
protection in the field of human rights. Such recommendations could include the functions of an
Ombudsman or commissioner for complaints, or other arrangements of a similar nature which the Council
of Ireland might think appropriate.
12. The conference also discussed the question of policing and the need to ensure public support for and
identification with the police service throughout the whole community. It was agreed that no single set of
proposals would achieve these aims overnight and that time would be necessary. The conference
expressed the hope that the wide range of agreement that had been reached and the consequent formation
of a power sharing executive, would make a major contribution to the creation of an atmosphere
throughout the community where there would be widespread support for and identification with all the
institutions of Northern Ireland.
13. It was broadly accepted that the two parts of Ireland were to a considerable extent interdependent in
the whole field of law and order and that the problems of political violence and identification with the
police service cannot be solved without taking account of that fact.
14. Accordingly, the British Government stated that as soon as the security problems were resolved and
the new institutions were seen to be working effectively, they would wish to discuss the devolution of
responsibilities for normal policing and how this might be achieved with the Northern Ireland executive
and the police.
15. With a view to improving policing throughout the island and developing community identification
with and support for the police services, the Governments concerned will cooperate under the auspices of a
Council of Ireland through their respective police authorities. To this end the Irish Government would set
up a police authority, appointments to which would be made after consultation with the council of
ministers of the Council of Ireland. In the case of the Northern Ireland police authority, appointments
would be made after consultation with the Northern Ireland executive which would consult with the
council of ministers of the Council of Ireland. When the two police authorities are constituted they will
make their own arrangements to achieve the objectives set out above.
16. An independent complaints procedure for dealing with complaints against the police will be set up.
1 7. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland will set up an all party committee from the assembly to
examine how best to introduce effective policing throughout Northern Ireland with particular reference to
the need to achieve public identification with the police.
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18. The conference took note of a reaffirmation by the British Government to bring detention to an end in
Northern Ireland, for all sections of the community as soon as the security situation permits, and noted also
that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland hopes to be able to bring in his statutory powers of selective
release in time for a number of detainees to be released before Christmas.
19. The British Government stated that, in the light of decisions reached at the conference, they would
now seek the authority of Parliament to devolve full powers to the Northern Ireland Executive and the
Northern Ireland Assembly, as soon as possible. The formal appointment of the Northern Ireland
Executive would then be made.
20. The conference agreed that a formal conference would be held early in the new year at which the
British and Irish Governments and the Northern Ireland Executive would meet together to consider reports
of the studies which have been commissioned and to sign the agreement reached.
"Text of Communique After Talks on Ireland" Times (London). 10 December 1973, 2.
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APPENDIX D: THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION/
JOINT DECLARATION
Messagefrom the Government
This Joint Declaration is a charter for peace and reconciliation in Ireland. Peace is a very simple, but also a
very powerful idea, whose time has come. The Joint Declaration provides from everyone's point of view a
noble means of establishing the first steps towards a lasting peace in Ireland.
The central idea behind the Peace Declaration is that the problems of Northern Ireland, however
deep and intractable, however difficult to reconcile, have to be resolved exclusively by political and
democratic means. Its objective is to heal divisions among the peoples of Ireland.
The Declaration makes it clear that it is for the people of Ireland, North and South, to achieve
agreement without outside impediment. The British Government have also declared that they will
encourage, enable and facilitate such an agreement, and that they will endorse whatever agreement
emerges and take the necessary steps to implement it. The language of the Declaration quite clearly makes
both Governments persuaders for agreement between the people of Ireland.
The dynamic for future progress must reside in the full use of the democratic political process, in
the underlying changes in Irish society, North and South, and in our external environment.
Peace is the first essential for better relationships on this island. The Joint Declaration is only the
first stage in the Peace Process. There will never be a better opportunity. Peace will allow us to develop a




The Taoiseach, Mr. Albert Reynolds TD, and the Prime Minister, the Rt Hon John Major,
acknowledge that the most urgent and important issue facing the people of Ireland, North and South, and
the British and Irish Governments together, is to remove the causes of conflict, to overcome the legacy of
history and to heal the divisions which have resulted, recognizing that the absence of a lasting and
satisfactory settlement of relationships between the peoples of both islands has contributed to continuing
tragedy and suffering. They believe that the development of an agreed framework for peace, which has
been discussed between them since early last year, and which is based on a number of key principles
articulated by the adaptation of other widely accepted principles, provides the starting point of a peace
designed to culminate in a political settlement.
2. The Taoiseach and the Prime Minister are convinced of the inestimable value to both their peoples,
and particularly for the next generation, of healing divisions in Ireland and of ending a conflict which has
been so manifestly to the detriment of all. Both recognize that the ending of divisions can come about only
through the agreement and co-operation of the people, North and South, representing both traditions in
Ireland. They therefore make a solemn commitment to promote co-operation at all levels on the basis of
the fundamental principles, undertakings, obligations under international agreements, to which they have
jointly committed themselves, and the guarantees which each Government has given and now reaffirms,
including Northern Ireland's statutory constitutional guarantee. It is their aim to foster agreement and
reconciliation, leading to a new political framework founded on consent and encompassing arrangements
within Northern Ireland, for the whole island, and between these islands.
3. They also consider that the development of Europe will, of itself, require new approaches to serve
interests common to both parts of the island of Ireland, and to Ireland and the United Kingdom as partners
in the European Union.
4. The Prime Minister, on behalf of the British Government, reaffirms that they will uphold the
democratic wish of a greater number of the people of Northern Ireland on the issue of whether they prefer
to support the Union or a sovereign united Ireland. On this basis, he reiterates, on behalf of the British
Government, that they have no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland. Their primary
interest is to see peace, stability and reconciliation established by agreement among all the people who
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inhabit the island, and they will work together with the Irish Government to achieve such an agreement,
which will embrace the totality of relationships. The role of the British Government will be to encourage,
facilitate and enable the achievement of such agreement over a period through a process of dialogue and
co-operation based on full respect for the rights and identities of both traditions in Ireland. They accept
that such agreement may, as of right, take the form of agreed structures for the island as a whole, including
a united Ireland achieved by peaceful means on the following basis. The British Government agree that it
is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively, to exercise
their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to
bring about a united Ireland if that is their wish. They reaffirm as a binding obligation that they will, for
their part, introduce the necessary legislation to give effect to this, or equally to any measure of agreement
on future relationships in Ireland which the people living in Ireland may themselves freely so determine
without external impediment. They believe that the people of Britain would wish, in friendship to all sides,
to enable the people of Ireland to reach agreement on how they may live together in harmony and in
partnership, with respect for their diverse traditions, and with full recognition of the special links and the
unique relationship which exist between the peoples of Britain and Ireland.
5. The Taoiseach, on behalf of the Irish government, considers that the lessons of Irish history, and
especially of Northern Ireland, show that stability and well-being will not be found under any political
system which is refused allegiance or rejected on grounds of identity by a significant minority of those
governed by it. for this reason, it would be wrong to attempt to impose a united Ireland, in the absence of
the freely given consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. He accepts, on behalf of the Irish
Government, that the democratic right of self-determination by the people of Ireland as a whole must be
achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of
Northern Ireland and must, consistent with justice an equity, respect the democratic dignity and the civil
rights and religious liberties of both communities, including:
the right of free political thought;
the right to freedom and expression of religion;
the right to pursue democratically national and political aspirations;
the right to seek constitutional change by peaceful and legitimate means;
the right to live wherever one chooses without hindrance;
the right to equal opportunity in all social and economic activity, regardless of class, creed, sex, or
colour.
These would be reflected in any future political and constitutional arrangements emerging from a new and
more broadly based agreement.
6. The Taoiseach however recognizes the genuine difficulties and barriers to building relationships of
trust either within or beyond Northern Ireland, from which both traditions suffer. He will work to create a
new era of trust, in which suspicion of the motives or actions of others is removed on the part of either
community. He considers that the future of the island depends on the nature of the relationship between
the two main traditions that inhabit it. Every effort must be made to build a new sense of trust between
those communities. In recognition of the fears of the Unionist community and as a token of his willingness
to make a personal contribution to the building up of that necessary trust, the Taoiseach will examine with
his colleagues any elements in the democratic life and organization of the Irish State that can be
represented to the Irish Government in the course of political dialogue as a real and substantial threat to
their way of life and ethos, or that can be represented as not being fully consistent with a modern
democratic and pluralist society, and undertakes to examine any possible ways of removing such obstacles.
Such an examination would of course have due regard to the desire to preserve those inherited values that
are largely shared throughout the island or that belong to the cultural and historical roots of the people of
this island in all their diversity. The Taoiseach hopes that over time a meeting of hears and minds will
develop, which will bring all the people of Ireland together, and will work towards that objective, but he
pledges in the meantime that a s a result of the efforts that will be made to build mutual confidence no
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Northern Unionist should ever have to fear in future that this ideal will be pursued either by threat or
coercion.
7. Both Governments accept that Irish unity would be achieved only by those who favor this outcome
persuading those who do not, peacefully and without coercion or violence, and that, if in the future a
majority of the people of Northern Ireland are so persuaded, both Governments will support and give
legislative effect to their wish. But, notwithstanding the solemn affirmation by both Governments in the
Anglo-Irish Agreement that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the
consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, the Taoiseach also recognizes the continuing
uncertainties and misgivings which dominate so much of Northern Unionist attitudes towards the rest of
Ireland. He believes that we stand at a stage of our history when the genuine feelings of all traditions in the
North must be recognized and acknowledged. He appeals to both traditions at this time to grasp the
opportunity for a fresh start and a new beginning, which could hold such promise for all our lives and
generations to come. He asks the people of Northern Ireland to look on the people of the Republic as
friends, who share their grief and shame over all the suffering of the last quarter of a century, and who
want to develop the best possible relationship with them, a relationship in which trust and a new
understanding can flourish and grow. The Taoiseach also acknowledges the presence in the constitution of
the Republic of elements which are deeply resented by Northern Unionists, but which at the same time
reflect hopes and ideals which lie deep in the hearts of many Irish men and women North and South. But
as we move towards a new era of understanding in which new relationships of trust may grow and bring
peace to the island of Ireland, the Taoiseach believes that the time has come to consider together how best
the hopes an identities of all can be expressed in more balances ways, which no longer engender division
and the lack of trust to which he has referred. He confirms that, in the event of an overall settlement, the
Irish Government will, as part of a balanced constitutional accommodation, put forward and support
proposals for change in the Irish constitution which would fully reflect the principle of consent in Northern
Ireland.
8. The Taoiseach recognises the need to engage in dialogue which would address with honesty and
integrity the fears of all traditions. But that dialogue, both within North and between the people and their
representatives of both parts of Ireland, must be entered into with an acknowledgment that the future
security and welfare of the people of the island will depend on an open, frank and balanced approach to all
the problems which for too long have caused division.
9. The British and Irish Governments will seek, along with the Northern Ireland constitutional parties
through a process of political dialogue, to create institutions and structures which, while respecting the
diversity of the people of Ireland, would enable them to work together in all areas of common interest.
This will help over a period to build the trust necessary to end past divisions, leading to an agreed and
peaceful future. Such structures would, of course, include institutional recognition of the special links that
exist between the peoples of Britain and Ireland as part of the totality of relationships, while taking account
of newly forged links with the rest of Europe.
10. The British and Irish governments reiterate that the achievement of peace must involve a permanent
end to the use of, or support for, paramilitary violence, They confirm that, in these circumstances,
democratically mandated parties which establish a commitment to exclusively peaceful methods and which
have shown that they abide by the democratic process, are free to participate fully in democratic politics
and to join in dialogue in due course between the Governments and the political parties on the way ahead.
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The Irish Government would make their own arrangements within their jurisdiction to enable
democratic parties to consult together and share in dialogue about the political future. The Taoiseach 's
intention is that these arrangements could include the establishment, in consultation with other parties, of a
Forum for Peace and Reconciliation to make recommendations on ways in which agreement and trust
between both traditions in Ireland can be promoted and established.
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12. The Taoiseach and the Prime Minister are determined to build on the fervent wish of both their
peoples to see old fears and animosities replaced by a climate of peace. They believe the framework they
have set out offers the people of Ireland, North and South, whatever their tradition, the basis to agree that
from now on their differences can be negotiated and resolved exclusively by peaceful political means.
They appeal to all concerned to grasp the opportunity for a new departure. That step would comprise no
position or principle, nor prejudice the future for either community. On the contrary, it would be an
incomparable gain for all. It would break decisively the cycle of violence and the intolerable suffering it
entails for the people of these islands, particularly of both communities in Northern Ireland. It would allow
the process of economic and social co-operation on the island to realize its full potential for prosperity and
mutual understanding. It would transform the prospects for building on the progress already made in the
Talks process, involving the two Governments and the constitutional parties in Northern Ireland. The
Taoiseach and the Prime Minister believe that these arrangements offer an opportunity to lay the
foundations for a more peaceful and harmonious future devoid of the violence and bitter divisions which
have scarred the past generation. The commit themselves and their Governments to continue to work
together, unremittingly, towards that objective.
15 December 1993
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